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WHY COGNITIVE SCIENCE PROVES THE 
EMPERORS HAVE NO ROBES 
John Campbell† 
Every judge comes to the bench with personal experiences. If you 
assume that your personal experiences define the outcome, you’re going 
to be a very poor judge, because you’re not going to convince anybody of 
your views . . . . We have to know those moments when our personal 
bias is seeping in to our decision-making. If we’re not, then we’re not 
being very good judges. We’re not being fair and impartial.1 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
[P]eople make choices for reasons unknown to them and they make 
up reasonable-sounding justifications for their choices, all the while 
remaining unaware of their actual motives and subsequent 
rationalizations.2 
Joshua D. Greene 
INTRODUCTION 
In a blunt article appearing in The New Republic, Judge 
Posner criticized Justice Scalia asserting that he is not really a 
textual originalist at all, and that instead, he relies on 
whatever canon of construction will allow him to support his 
conservative views on abortion, states’ rights, guns, and other 
issues.3 Indirectly, Judge Posner suggested that Scalia is either 
unwilling or incapable of engaging in the personal reflection 
 
 † Lawyering Process Professor – University of Denver Sturm College of Law. 
Thanks to Justice Posner for the inspiration that led to this piece—both for his article 
and for his comments to me and other attorneys years ago regarding arbitration. 
Thanks to Alicia Campbell and Erich Vieth.  
 1 Interview by Gwen Ifill with Sonia Sotomayor, Supreme Court Justice, on 
PBS NEWSHOUR (Feb. 20, 2013), transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
bb/law/jan-june13/justice_02-20.html. 
 2 Joshua D. Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, in 3 MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY: EMOTION, DISEASE, AND 
DEVELOPMENT 35, 36 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2007). 
 3 Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/
scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism#. 
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that Justice Sotomayor suggests is essential to decision making.4 
The title of Judge Posner’s article alone would be enough to raise 
eyebrows; Posner titled his work: The Incoherence of Antonin 
Scalia.5 For many who have wrestled with some of Scalia’s 
decisions—both those he wrote and those in which he joined the 
majority—Posner’s words echoed their own criticisms that Scalia 
is prone to inaccuracy in his recitation of case law, that his 
commitment to textual originalism is questionable, and that in 
all, Scalia seems to use his “interpretative principles” to reach 
results that fit more with his political and social views than 
they do with the law he claims he relies upon.6 These same 
assertions are often made more broadly about the conservative 
majority of the United States Supreme Court (Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, Roberts, Alito, and Kennedy).7 
This article asks two questions that grow out of this 
discussion. First, is there any evidence that the conservative 
majority is actually bending the law to the majority’s common 
business-friendly beliefs? And second, if Judge Posner is right, and 
it applies to more than Scalia, why and how is this happening? To 
get at these questions, this article examines two split decisions in 
which the conservative majority won the day: Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds International Corp.,8 and AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion.9 The first opinion was written by Justice Alito10 and 
the second by Justice Scalia.11 An analysis of these cases leads to 
one conclusion: these opinions are fundamentally, legally unsound. 
But this article offers more than a mere conclusion that 
the “emperors have no robes.” As the title suggests, the article 
employs cognitive science to attempt to explain why the 
conservative majority got it so wrong, and, maybe more 
importantly, why the conservative majority did not seem to 
notice. It addresses how the opinions can cite precedent 
extensively if it is indeed true that they are inconsistent with it. 
The somewhat surprising conclusion, at least to those who would 
 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See, e.g., Connor D. Deverell, Note, Defining a Corporation’s “Principal 
Place of Business”: The United States Supreme Court Decision in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 
56 LOY. L. REV. 733, 755 (2010); David L. Franklin, What Kind of Business Friendly 
Court? Explaining the Chamber of Commerce’s Success at the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1019, 1056 (2009); A.E. Dick Howard, Out of Infancy: The Roberts Court 
at Seven, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 76, 80-82 (2012). 
 8 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1763 (2010). 
 9 AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1743 (2011). 
 10 See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1763. 
 11 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1743. 
2013] MIS-CONCEPCION  109 
simply bash the majority, is that it is entirely possible that those 
in the majority believe they are being rational, considering both 
sides of the argument, and following precedent when in reality 
they are being driven by intuition and emotion.12 This is true 
because many cognitive errors, some of which are discussed 
below, are invisible to those who fall prey to them. 
Analyzing the Court’s opinions from a legal standpoint 
is doable, but scrutinizing them as to why the majority missed 
the mark is more difficult. A powerful tool for rooting this out 
lies in cognitive science. It is useful because it provides (1) an 
explanation for how beliefs could drive rationalizations,13 and 
(2) some hints on how to identify when this is happening. 
A growing body of literature regarding decision making 
concludes that intuition drives reason. In fact, the emotive 
process, which is wrapped up with intuition, often drives our 
fundamental beliefs, but because we live in a social world and 
because we must defend our beliefs, we construct rationales for 
them.14 The result is that humans are prone to provide reasons 
for beliefs in a manner that suggests the reasons caused the 
beliefs, even though, in truth, the beliefs caused the reasons.15 
This article coins a phrase for this phenomenon, calling it 
“intuition rationalization” or “IR.” 
Cognitive science goes beyond identifying the 
phenomenon. It also suggests that highly intelligent people are 
especially adept at constructing post hoc justifications for these 
intuitive beliefs, making it more likely that others with the same 
underlying beliefs can latch onto the purported “justifications.”16 
This is a possible explanation for why the majority’s opinions 
are at least facially rational and why they can garner 
majorities. Finally, cognitive science teaches that when people 
engage in intuition rationalization, they genuinely believe that 
they are working through the problem; it is not a ruse or a lie, 
it is a form of self-talk that leads to self-delusion.17 
But, if it is true that IR can and does occur everywhere, 
including legal opinions, and if it is equally true that, at least 
on its face, it looks like rationality, how can it be identified? 
Relying on cognitive science, this article identifies a checklist for 
 
 12 JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED 
BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 41-47 (2012). 
 13 Id. at 38. 
 14 Id. at 39. 
 15 See id. at 46. 
 16 See id. 
 17 See generally id. at 39. 
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some of the most common traits of IR. This list is the first of its 
kind to be applied to legal reasoning. These markers prove 
useful for testing Posner’s hypothesis that Justice Scalia’s 
reasoning is really a malleable act of intuition rationalization,18 
and for testing the broader hypothesis that the conservative 
majority is engaging in post hoc reasoning to justify opinions 
that align with their fundamental goals and beliefs. The 
telltale signs of IR include: 
• Strained reasoning – because post hoc reasoning is a 
justification, not a driving force for the actual belief, the 
justifications offered for the belief are often logically 
flawed or inconsistent. This is especially true when the 
belief is driven by a response to taboo or deeply held, 
but never examined, beliefs;19 
• Confirmation bias – a tendency to cherry-pick facts that 
support an already-formed belief;20 
• Substitution – substituting an easy question that can be 
answered for more complex, difficult questions;21 
• Creation of “my-side” arguments – the creation of 
supporting arguments without a parallel effort or ability 
to consider “other-side” arguments.22 Interestingly, the 
ability to create longer and longer “my-side” lists 
correlates positively with intelligence, but intelligence 
does not produce longer “other-side” lists;23 
• Persistence (or stubbornness) – a belief that persists in 
the face of counterarguments that should be 
persuasive;24 and 
• Overconfidence – often displayed by unnecessarily 
strong wording, a failure to identify weaknesses, or a 
willingness to disregard other opinions or ideas out-of-
hand.25  
 
 18 See Posner, supra note 3. 
 19 See HAIDT, supra note 12 at 39. 
 20 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 81 (2011). 
 21 See id. at 97-98. 
 22 HAIDT, supra note 12 at 80-81. 
 23 See id. at 94. 
 24 See id. at 69. 
 25 KAHNEMAN, supra note 20 at 87. 
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If the opinions written by Justices Alito and Scalia are a 
product of IR, that is, if they are intuition dressed as cold 
rationality, then a close examination of the opinions should 
reveal some or all of the indicia described above. To this end, 
Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion, both handed down within the 
last two years, provide ideal specimens for dissection. 
These opinions are particularly well-suited for analysis 
for several reasons. First, they both produced business-friendly 
results, which some allege is a fundamental belief of the 
conservative majority.26 Second, the opinions are suitable because 
they, at least on their face, announce no fundamental alteration 
to existing precedent.27 Instead, they are written as if they are the 
inevitable result of the application of immutable principles. 
Third, some scholars have already suggested that they are 
fundamentally inconsistent with existing law.28 Fourth, the 
opinions each include a vigorous dissent. These dissents serve 
as both a means for considering how the majority dealt with 
potential counter-arguments, and as a check on whether it 
omitted information that would have called the conclusions 
into question.29 Finally, the opinions fit nicely in my knowledge 
base and skill set.30 I briefed, and in some cases argued, 
appellate cases dealing with both opinions at a variety of 
appellate courts, including the United States Supreme Court. 
As a result, I am intimately aware of the precedential value 
ascribed to the two selected decisions by those who seek to use 
them to insulate businesses from class actions, and I am aware 
of the real world results the opinions have produced. 
Before going further, I offer a few concessions. First, I 
readily concede that IR is not limited to conservative jurists. 
 
 26 See Mark Koba, Chamber of Commerce Keeps Scoring With High Court, 
CNBC (June 28, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100846493. 
 27 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
 28 See, e.g., William W. Park, The Politics of Class Action Arbitration: 
Jurisdictional Legitimacy and Vindication of Contract Rights, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 837 
(2012); Jonathon L. Serafini, Note, The Deception of Concepcion: Saving Unconscionability 
after AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 187 (2012–2013). 
 29 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1756; Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1777. 
 30 The most obvious example of my involvement in cases that turn on 
questions of arbitrability is Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486 (Mo.) cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 191, reh’g denied, 1333 S. Ct. 684 (2012). In that case, I served as 
lead counsel representing a putative class of borrowers who received high interest title 
loans. The case ultimately led me to argue before the Missouri Court of Appeals once 
and the Missouri Supreme Court twice. It also required two separate sets of filing and 
review by the United States Supreme Court. The case involved arbitration and 
presented the tension between Missouri’s dislike for some class action waivers in 
arbitration clauses and the Court’s approval of arbitration. 
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Anyone can certainly find intuition dressed as reason in liberal 
opinions, and if one digs hard enough, they may find indicia of 
IR in this article. The point is not to condemn IR; it is part of 
human cognition. Rather, the purpose is to identify IR and to 
begin to address its existence. I focus on the conservative 
majority because its members purport to engage in pure 
reasoning based on where the appropriate legal precedent, 
statutory language, and Constitutional provisions lead. I feel 
comfortable suggesting that Justice Scalia would adamantly 
dispute that he engages in cognitive shortcuts, is driven by his 
beliefs rather than by textual analysis, or that his interpretative 
principles are really more like loose guidelines. But, as I prove in 
this article, IR is deeply embedded in at least the two 
conservative majority’s opinions examined in this article. I 
contend that identifying this truth is useful for examining 
errant decisions and understanding how those decisions went 
off the rails. I also contend that until judges recognize that 
they, like everyone else, could be subject to IR, they will remain 
blind to it. This leads to overconfidence in decisions as 
impersonal acts of cold reason, which, as demonstrated in this 
article, can lead to fundamentally unsound decisions with 
dangerous real world impacts. I leave for others to discuss what 
the proper judicial interpretation methods should be; for now, I 
am content to assert only that it merits illumination if judges 
contend they employ pure reason, but in reality they do not. 
The remainder of the article unfolds by first considering 
Posner’s critiques, then putting them in the context of principles 
of cognitive science. Next, I apply legal analysis and cognitive 
science to evaluate the conservative majority opinions in Stolt-
Nielsen and Concepcion. I note that this treatment is relatively 
detailed. This proved necessary to do justice to the legal 
reasoning required to unravel the decisions and to reveal enough 
about the decisions to flesh out how IR was at play. Finally, I 
offer some takeaways from the analysis and offer some 
suggestions for training judges to better consider the role of IR 
in their thinking and decisions. 
Part I sets out in more detail some of Posner’s critiques. 
These are useful because they provide a thoughtful third-party 
take on the reasoning of Scalia, considered by many to be the 
ringleader of the conservative majority. Because Posner’s article 
describes a number of perceived fallacies in Scalia’s reasoning 
and then concludes that these are evidence that Scalia is 
bending reason to his will, Posner’s article serves as a starting 
2013] MIS-CONCEPCION  113 
point for observing in action some of the telltale logical fallacies 
that are the markers of IR. 
Part II provides an intellectual underpinning for 
Posner’s article by correlating the flaws Posner identified with 
cognitive science. The purpose is to familiarize the reader with 
common cognitive fallacies and to identify theories on how gut-
feelings and moral beliefs drive reasoning. To do this, I rely 
heavily on the work of Daniel Kahneman, the author of 
Thinking, Fast and Slow,31 and Jonathan Haidt, the author of 
The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics 
and Religion.32 These works are extraordinary because they are 
written in plain English for the non-cognitive science reader 
and they draw their conclusions from hundreds of other 
studies. As a result, by relying on these two texts, I was able to 
learn from the wisdom of dozens of other cognitive and 
behavioral scientists, while relying on Kahneman and Haidt to 
do the hard work of pulling the studies together. 
Part III examines the test cases, and then it identifies 
IR within those cases. First, I summarize the holdings of the 
two test cases, Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion. Then I put on my 
lawyer hat in order to analyze a variety of holdings and sub-
holdings in the cases in light of the substantive law that should 
have been applied. I conduct my investigation by treating the 
decisions as if they were a law school exam answer. What was 
the applicable law? What did the majority say? Does this 
analysis hold water? I conclude that the majority often reached 
conclusions that were not supported by fact, applied the wrong 
law, applied the right law wrongly, or implicitly overruled past 
Supreme Court precedent without acknowledging that it did so. 
I also note that the decisions produce both illogical and 
inequitable results in the real world, adding support to the 
conclusion that they are products of IR. After each section in 
Part III, I correlate the legal analysis to my identified markers 
of IR. In doing so, I establish that the reasoning of the majority 
is rife with indicia of IR. The results are discussed, and then 
provided in a simple table for reference. 
Because I conclude that IR is at play, this suggests that 
emotion and intuition are driving the decisions. In Part IV I 
venture a suggestion as to what may be driving the conservative 
majority. Some basic data regarding how the cases have affected 
 
 31 See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 20. 
 32 See generally HAIDT, supra note 12. 
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filing rates of class actions is considered as well as the views of 
some other scholars who have considered the opinions. 
Part V briefly discusses the implications of my findings, 
suggesting that since IR is at play in the conservative majority’s 
decisions, and since IR is a common human condition, it should 
be further studied. I pose a list of questions—a research agenda 
of sorts—for future authors (including me). I also suggest that 
identifying IR explicitly and incorporating cognitive science 
lessons into judicial training would be wise. 
I. POSNER’S CRITIQUE OF “THE INCOHERENT ANTONIN 
SCALIA” 
Posner’s article created a buzz in the legal community. 
It isn’t every day that an intellectual heavyweight like Posner, 
who is also considered a conservative jurist by many, takes a 
swing at a sitting Supreme Court Justice who happens to be 
undoubtedly conservative. For this article, Posner’s criticisms 
serve as a warm-up. Although he did not relate his conclusions 
to cognitive science, they match up nicely with many of the 
markers identified herein and help introduce the concepts. For 
example, Posner says that Scalia cherry-picks information, 
ignores counterarguments, displays internal inconsistencies, and 
writes opinions that are overconfident but under-supported.33 
Part II will show that these characteristics are predicted by 
cognitive science. 
Judge Posner’s article was written in response to a book 
written by Scalia and the well-known legal writing expert, 
Bryan Garner.34 In the book, titled Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts, Scalia and Garner claim to set out 
a defense for textual originalism.35 They describe originalists as 
those who “look for meaning in the governing text, ascribe to 
that text the meaning that it has borne from its inception, and 
reject judicial speculation about both the drafters’ extratextually 
derived purposes and the desirability of the fair reading’s 
anticipated consequences.”36 To this end, they applaud cases 
that apply literal meaning, and they somewhat idly speculate 
about how to interpret everyday language, such as a sign at the 
 
 33 Posner, supra note 3. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012); see also Posner, supra note 3, ascribing the 
name “textual originalism” to Scalia and Garner’s work. 
 36 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 35 at xxvii; see also Posner, supra note 3. 
2013] MIS-CONCEPCION  115 
entrance to a butcher shop that reads “No dogs, cats, and other 
animals allowed.”37 Along the way, they also invoke the name of 
well-known Justices who they claim were also originalists, and in 
general, they decry the work of the “so-called consequentialis[t],” 
who they assert inappropriately engages in the practice of 
asking, “is this decision good for the little guy?”38 
The book might be considered a tour de force by 
conservatives but for the work of Judge Posner. Unfortunately 
for Scalia and Garner, Judge Posner chose to read the book as 
only he could. He apparently was not impressed. In his critique, 
he refutes most of the positions advanced in the book.39 
To begin, he points out that although professing to 
believe in originalism, Scalia and Garner set out no less than 57 
principles of interpretation.40 He documents that many of the 
judges who were alleged “originalists” actually relied on common 
sense, legislative history, and other resources that should be 
anathema to Scalia and Garner.41 And perhaps most interestingly, 
he carefully examines the wide range of cases set out by Scalia and 
Garner and determines that many of them simply do not say what 
Scalia and Garner say they do.42 
Posner recounts the moment when he decided to start 
putting the authors to their proof.43 He writes: 
Scalia and Garner ridicule a decision by the Supreme Court of Kansas 
(State ex rel. Miller v. Claiborne) that held that cockfighting did not 
violate the state’s law against cruelty to animals. They say that the 
court, in defiance of the dictionary, “perversely held that roosters are not 
‘animals.’” When I read this, I found it hard to believe that a court would 
hold that roosters are not animals, so I looked up the case. I discovered 
that the court had not held that roosters are not animals. It was then 
that I started reading the other cases cited by Scalia and Garner.44 
From this starting point, Posner reviewed several more 
cited cases and concluded they were inconsistent with how 
Scalia and Garner presented them.45 In some cases he notes 
that although Scalia and Garner criticize the decision, it could 
 
 37 Posner, supra note 3. A literal reading of this sign could prohibit humans 
from entering. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Posner, supra note 3. Garner wrote an eloquent comeback to Posner. Bryan 
A. Garner, Response to Richard A. Posner, LAW PROSE (Sept. 5, 2012), 
http://www.lawprose.org/blog/?p=570. The debate continues. 
 40 Posner, supra note 3. 
 41 See id. 
 42 See id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
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be justified by textual originalism.46 In others, he points out 
that Scalia and Garner, to advance their assertions, ignore 
other rationales provided by courts.47 In all, Posner suggests, 
not too subtly, that Scalia and Garner have not faithfully read 
or recited the cases.48 
Perhaps emboldened, or annoyed, by this fact, Posner 
also turns to the authors’ treatment of other interpretive 
theories.49 He calls the authors’ characterization of these theories 
“disingenuous.”50 And finally, in a compelling set of paragraphs, 
Posner chronicles how Scalia and Garner, in only a few pages in 
their books, flip flop between embracing “dynamic” interpretation 
to repudiating it, to embracing it again.51 
All this leads Posner to a conclusion that reads more 
like a rather serious accusation. Posner writes: 
A problem that undermines their entire approach is the authors’ lack 
of a consistent commitment to textual originalism. They endorse 
fifty-seven “canons of construction,” or interpretive principles, and in 
their variety and frequent ambiguity these “canons” provide them with 
all the room needed to generate the outcome that favors Justice Scalia’s 
strongly felt views on such matters as abortion, homosexuality, illegal 
immigration, states’ rights, the death penalty, and guns.52 
Put plainly, Posner asserts that Scalia’s commitment to 
textual originalism is a sham, used to justify results that are in 
keeping with Scalia’s political and personal opinions. Posner 
concludes his article with a jab:  
Justice Scalia has called himself in print a “faint-hearted 
originalist.” It seems he means the adjective at least as sincerely as 
he means the noun.53 
Judge Posner’s article is a powerful critique, and it cries 
out for follow-up. But piling on is of no value. Instead, I see in 
Posner’s article the seeds of a larger understanding of how Scalia, 
the conservative majority, and many other judges can believe they 
are employing reason when in reality they are acting as slaves to 
their own deeply held beliefs. I use Posner as a jumping-off 
point for this work, in no small part because he points out 
 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
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many of the same IR characteristics identified in the 
introduction and described in the following section.54 
II. DECISION MAKING 
Two of the most profound books on how we form beliefs 
and how we justify them were written in the last two years.55 
The first is titled Thinking, Fast and Slow, by Daniel 
Kahneman.56 The second, written by Jonathan Haidt, is titled 
The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics 
and Religion.57 Kahneman’s book focuses largely on decision 
making and the many mistakes humans make in forming their 
decisions.58 Haidt covers some of the same ground, but his 
orientation is different. He examines not only how people make 
decisions, but how this relates to reason and peoples’ ability, or 
inability, to relate to those who have differing views.59 In the 
following paragraphs, the literature of Haidt and Kahneman is 
examined. Along the journey, as we come across markers of IR, 
they are gathered and noted. 
Haidt advances the Social Intuitionist Model, in which 
intuitions come first and reasoning is usually produced after a 
judgment is made, in order to influence other people.60 He does 
not suggest that reason can never influence judgment or 
intuition, but he suggests it is rare.61 He proves this a number 
of ways, including by interviewing people and asking them 
about things they will almost certainly think are morally 
wrong, but that they cannot reasonably support.62 
I examine findings by authors below in order to identify 
IR markers used throughout the rest of this article. 
A. Strained Reasoning 
In an especially clever study, Haidt and his colleagues 
presented people with scenarios they knew are “disgusting” but in 
which it is hard to suggest, at least based on reason, that the 
 
 54 Id. 
 55 HAIDT, supra note 12; KAHNEMAN, supra note 20. 
 56 KAHNEMAN, supra note 20. 
 57 HAIDT, supra note 12. 
 58 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 20. 
 59 See HAIDT, supra note 12, at 221-22. 
 60 HAIDT, supra note 12, at 55. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 42-48. 
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people in the stories did something objectively wrong. For 
example, in one study, subjects were told a story about Jennifer.63 
Jennifer works in a hospital pathology lab. She’s a vegetarian for 
moral reasons—she thinks it is wrong to kill animals. But one night 
she has to incinerate a fresh human cadaver, and she thinks it’s a 
waste to throw away edible flesh. So she cuts off a piece of flesh and 
takes it home. Then she cooks it and eats it.64 
Only 13% of the people surveyed said that what 
Jennifer did was acceptable.65 
In another study, people were presented with a brother 
and sister pair traveling together in France.66 The two were alone 
in a cabin one night and decided to have sex.67 They told no one, 
they were safe, and they agreed to never do it again.68 
Only 20% of the survey participants deemed the behavior 
of the brother and the sister appropriate.69 But, Haidt reports that 
people struggled with providing reasons.70 When people did 
provide reasons, they were often strained.71 For instance, 
regarding the brother and sister, a study subject argued that 
children from incest were more likely to be deformed. When the 
experimenter pointed out that birth control and condoms were 
used, the subject strained to answer why incest was still 
wrong.72 The same subject wondered aloud if the brother or 
sister were too young (apparently considering statutory rape), 
then recognized they weren’t, and seemed disappointed.73 When 
pushed for another reason, the subject said, “I mean, there’s 
just no way I could change my mind but I just don’t know how 
to – how to show what I’m feeling, what I feel about it.”74 
Haidt illustrates the paradox of intuition driving 
reasoning by discussing the rider and the elephant.75 In this 
metaphor, the elephant is our intuition, and the rider is 
reason.76 Haidt points out that the elephant has been developed 
 
 63 Id. at 45. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 38. 
 67 Id. at 45. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 45-46. 
 72 Id. at 46. 
 73 Id. at 46-47. 
 74 Id. at 47 (emphasis added). 
 75 Id. at 53. 
 76 Id. 
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over hundreds of millions of years of evolution.77 It is very good 
at doing most things.78 However, it is not all that good at being 
steered by reason.79 Haidt suggests that although the rider can 
sometimes help the elephant anticipate problems or make 
decisions that are better in the long term, all too often, the 
rider is used to “fabricat[e] post hoc explanations for whatever 
the elephant . . . wants to do next.”80 
Haidt’s work draws from the findings of others to support 
his conclusion. For example, in The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, 
Joshua Greene of Princeton relies upon neuroscience to 
demonstrate that people make decisions through emotional 
processing, not careful reasoning.81 In his experiments, Greene 
presented people with the opportunity to prevent harm to a group 
of people by causing harm to another, single person.82 Many of his 
experiments were variations of the “trolley dilemma.” In the 
trolley dilemma, subjects are asked whether or not they would 
push one person off a bridge and onto a track in front of a 
trolley if it were the only way to stop the trolley from running 
off the track and killing five people.83 Testing this and other 
variations, Greene learned through MRIs that with few 
exceptions, the regions of the brain related to emotional 
processing showed greater activity, activating almost 
immediately.84 The author concluded that “across the various 
stories, the relative strength of these emotional reactions 
predicted the final moral judgment.”85 
Greene further established the role of emotional 
processing by altering the design so that the subject could, instead 
of shoving someone onto the tracks, simply flip a switch that 
would divert the trolley onto a safer track, but would eventually 
terminate at a spot where one person was on the track, thereby 
killing them.86 Greene found that people were more willing to 
flip the switch than they were to shove a person off a bridge.87 
This is presumably because flipping a switch triggered a far 
less intense initial, emotional response.88 This clarified that 
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emotion—such as an aversion to directly shoving another to her 
death—drove decision making. A purely rational mind would 
conclude that whether you shove a person onto the track or flip a 
switch, the result is the same.89 One life is lost in order to save 
five. But that is not what the study revealed, suggesting that 
emotion plays a powerful role in decision making.90 
Perhaps most interestingly, when Greene talked to the 
subjects, they did not relate their decisions to intuition or 
emotion.91 Instead, they sought to provide rational justifications 
for their decisions.92 Of course, these justifications were often 
strained, as they were not the real reason for the belief. Again, 
strained reasoning is one of the markers of IR. 
Greene summarized these studies: 
We have strong feelings that tell us in clear and certain terms that 
some things simply cannot be done and that other things simply 
must be done. But it’s not obvious how to make sense of these 
feelings, and so we . . . make up a rationally appealing story.93 
These findings paint a picture. Subjects react 
emotionally, especially to things they find taboo or disgusting. 
Then, they use reason to justify their initial response. The point 
is not that people could never think of a reason why eating 
human flesh or incest is wrong. As a lawyer, one may 
immediately think of laws against desecrating bodies, the tort of 
conversion, statutory rape, etc. The point is that the initial 
reaction as to whether what was done was wrong or right was 
not intellectual. It was intuition.94 Only after the belief was 
formed did the intellect kick in to justify the emotional 
response. Or as Haidt explains, “[t]he intuition launched the 
reasoning, but the intuition did not depend on the success or 
failure of the reasoning.”95 
B. Persistence 
Building on his conviction that decision making is 
rooted in emotive processing and intuition, Haidt turns again 
 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 76-79. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 78. 
 94 I’m careful here to use “intuition” and not emotional. As Haidt later 
explains, “moral judgment is a cognitive process, as are all forms of judgment. The 
crucial distinction is really between two different kinds of cognition: intuition and 
reasoning.” Id. at 53. 
 95 Id. at 51. 
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to cognitive science to prove the next reasonable inference: if 
the mind is not driven by reason, then carefully articulated 
arguments probably will not change people’s minds.96 This 
provides us with another of the fundamental markers of intuition-
based decision making: persistence.97 A decision that is formed 
through IR is rarely altered through counterarguments.98 Even 
when study subjects were not to respond immediately, but were 
instead given two minutes to consider their decision and 
reasoning, most participants went with their original 
conclusion, and often had thought of stronger support 
arguments.99 
C. My-Side Arguments 
Haidt identifies yet another related marker. He 
recounts an experiment in which subjects were asked to think of 
a social issue, such as whether schools should receive more 
funding.100 The people were asked to write down their initial 
judgment and then to write down all the arguments for and 
against their position.101 These “my-side” and “other-side” 
arguments were then counted. Unsurprisingly, people came up 
with far more “my-side” arguments than “other-side” 
arguments.102 Perhaps even more importantly, the higher the IQ 
of the participant, the more “my-side” arguments they created.103 
Significantly, however, IQ did not improve one’s ability to think 
of “other-side” arguments.104 And here we find another marker 
of IR: creation of my-side arguments.105 The study suggests that 
intuition-based decision making might include a significant 
number of supporting arguments, but it will probably do a poor 
job of fairly considering “other-side” arguments and dealing 
with them.106 
Haidt is not alone in suggesting that most of our 
decision making is intuitive rather than calculative. In 
Thinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman reaches similar 
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conclusions.107 Kahneman illustrates the separation in the mind 
between snap-judgments and reason by talking about System 1 
(intuition) and System 2 (complex reasoning).108 He provides 
examples of what each system does.109 System 1 work includes: 
detecting hostility in a voice, determining which object is closer, 
answering the question, “What is 2+2,” and driving a car on an 
empty road.110 “System 2 engages in things like searching the 
memory to identify a surprising sound, comparing two washing 
machines for overall value, or checking the validity of a complex 
logical argument.”111 Kahneman asserts, based on extensive 
research, that engaging System 2 requires serious work.112 In one 
simple example, Kahneman suggests an experiment anyone can 
try. He says that the next time you are walking with a friend, ask 
that friend to multiply 17 x 24 in her head.113 Your friend will 
almost certainly stop in her tracks.114 People do this because we 
struggle to use System 1 while engaging System 2.115 
But, why does it matter that System 2 requires work? It 
matters because Kahneman’s research and study suggests that 
we will not use System 2 any more than we have to because we 
prefer “cognitive ease.”116 We are perfectly content to rely on 
intuition (System 1) in many cases. He suggests a new term—the 
“law of least effort.”117 This “law” states that people typically take 
the path of least resistance in solving problems.118 He concludes 
that in order for us to manage the thousands of decisions that we 
face every day, we rely heavily on heuristics.119 Throughout the 
rest of his book, he proves that this “laziness” and reliance on our 
intuition, although effective in many ordinary situations, means 
that in other settings we make decisions in irrational ways that 
lead to irrational results.120 From Kahneman’s work, we are 
able to identify several more markers of IR. 
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D. Confirmation Bias 
Kahneman suggests that one of the most pervasive 
cognition errors is the “confirmation bias.”121 Kahneman 
explains that the confirmation bias is a “deliberate search for 
confirming evidence . . . .”122 He writes that “contrary to the 
rules of philosophers of science, who advise testing hypotheses 
by trying to refute them, people (and scientists, quite often) 
seek data that are likely to be compatible with the beliefs they 
currently hold.”123 
Kahneman also chronicles a phenomenon he calls, What 
You See Is All There Is, or WYSIATI.124 He describes this as the 
mind’s willingness, even preference, to focus on the information 
readily available without reference to what is missing.125 For 
example, the leader of a non-profit organization might search 
for an event planner in the hopes of putting on a lecture 
series.126 The planner’s references are good, and at the meeting 
with the planner, the planner is prepared and smart. The planner 
points out that her last three non-profit events have led to 
significant fundraising. Based on this information, the leader 
selects the event planner. But, think what the leader may not 
have considered. How does the event planner’s price compare to 
what other event planners charge? Are there other event planners 
with more experience? Were the past fundraisers that the event 
planner mentioned successful because of the event planner, or 
were the charities well-established with a plethora of wealthy 
donors? Considering what the event planner and event will cost, 
what else could the non-profit do to raise funds for the same or 
less money? These are all valid questions, but they were not in 
the field of mental vision of the leader. Instead, the non-profit 
leader made a decision that felt like it was fully informed, 
based only on what was seen.127 The non-profit leader, in 
selecting the event planner, engaged in WYSIATI.128 
Because WYSIATI is the other-side of the confirmation bias 
coin, in this article, I use the term confirmation bias to describe 
both. In other words, I treat the confirmation bias as both the 
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desire to find confirming information and the willingness to ignore 
other information, or more importantly, gaps in information. 
E. Substitution 
Kahneman identifies another intriguing indicator of IR. 
He suggests that when System 1 is being relied upon instead of 
the careful thinking of System 2, individuals tend to engage in 
substitution.129 Specifically, when individuals are asked to answer 
difficult questions that would require lengthy deliberation, they 
often simply substitute a simpler question and answer it.130 
Kahneman suggests this substitution is invisible to the person 
who does it.131 
For example, Susan is asked if Candidate Davis would 
make a good president. This requires detailed analysis. To 
answer this question, Susan needs to know the detailed history 
of Candidate Davis, she needs to know and understand the 
problems facing the country, she needs to know Candidate 
Davis’s proposed solutions to those problems, and many other 
facts. Then she needs to consider all the information together. 
This could take months of thinking. What Susan might do 
instead is substitute the question. For example, she may ask, “Is 
Davis a Democrat?” If he is, and Susan is too, she may decide 
he’d make a good president. Or she might ask, “Is Davis a nice 
guy,” or as some studies suggest, “Is Davis good looking?” This 
substitution of one question for another is seamless, and it 
creates cognitive ease. As Kahneman explains, “the target 
question is the assessment you intend to produce. The heuristic 
question is the simpler question that you answer instead.”132 
Finally, although not a definitive marker of IR, 
Kahneman provides a predictor of when heuristics in general 
are especially likely to be deployed in place of System 2 
reasoning. He suggests that “[t]he dominance of conclusions over 
arguments is most pronounced where emotions are involved.”133 
Although this is not a marker in and of itself, it does suggest IR 
might be marked by an overall tone, or perhaps more subtle 
signs, of emotion. It also suggests that Posner might be right: if IR 
is most likely to arise in conjunction with emotion, topics like 
abortion, homosexuality, and gun control could certainly trigger it. 
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With these principles in mind and with our markers 
identified, Part III engages in a legally rigorous analysis of the 
conservative majority’s conclusions. 
III. ANALYZING THE CONSERVATIVE MAJORITY 
In this part I examine the conservative majority’s 
conclusions and reasoning in Stolt and Concepcion. First, I 
analyze the decisions from a legal perspective. Following the 
analysis, I note and discuss the markers of IR. The analysis 
begins with two substantive areas of law that play a significant 
role in the cases: the standard of review for arbitration decisions 
and preemption. These are particularly fruitful because they are 
fully developed and established bodies of law. For each, I discuss 
the applicable law, explain the majority’s opinion, and then 
scrutinize the majority’s decision under existing law. This 
discussion serves as a medium for identifying IR markers. I then 
turn to other aspects of the decisions. Specifically, the majority’s 
factual and legal assertions about class arbitration are 
considered. Relying on my own reasoning and drawing from the 
dissents’ arguments, I analyze the majority’s justification, again 
with an eye out for IR’s fingerprints. Finally, I examine the 
majority’s opinions to determine if they are consistent with 
past precedent.134 
A. Overview of Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion 
This section provides a general summary of Stolt-
Nielsen and Concepcion. The summary is not meant to be 
comprehensive. Rather, more specific parts of the holdings are 
included as appropriate through the remaining analytical 
sections. The purpose of this section is only to familiarize the 
reader with the basic facts and holdings. 
1. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp. 
Stolt-Nielsen was written by Justice Alito.135 It was a 5-3 
decision.136 Justice Ginsburg wrote a vigorous dissent that was 
 
 134 I considered organizing by case instead of by topic. However, because the 
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joined by Justices Breyer and Stevens.137 The essential facts 
and legal holdings follow. 
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. (Stolt) served much “of the world 
market for parcel tankers—seagoing vessels with 
compartments that are separately chartered to customers,” such 
as respondent (AnimalFeeds), who “wish[] to ship liquids in small 
quantities.”138 “AnimalFeeds ship[ped] its goods pursuant to a 
standard contract known in the maritime trade as a charter 
party.”139 The charter party that AnimalFeeds used contained an 
arbitration clause.140 AnimalFeeds brought a class action 
antitrust suit against Stolt for price fixing, and that suit was 
consolidated with similar suits brought by other charterers.141 
After a court ruling on arbitrability, the parties agreed that they 
“must arbitrate their antitrust dispute.”142 AnimalFeeds sought 
arbitration on behalf of a class of purchasers of parcel tanker 
transportation services.143 The parties agreed to submit the 
question whether their arbitration agreement allowed for class 
arbitration to a panel of arbitrators bound by class rules developed 
by the American Arbitration Association following Green Tree 
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).144 
One of the Class Arbitration Rules at AAA required an 
arbitrator to determine whether the arbitration clause permitted 
class arbitration.145 The parties selected an arbitration panel, 
designated New York City as the arbitration site, and stipulated 
that their arbitration clause was “silent” on the class arbitration 
issue.146 The panel determined that the arbitration clause 
allowed for class arbitration.147 AnimalFeeds filed for the court 
to vacate the arbitrators’ award.148 
The district court vacated the award.149 It concluded 
that the arbitrators’ award was made in “manifest disregard” of 
the law, asserting that had the arbitrators conducted a choice-of-
law analysis, they would have applied the rule of federal 
maritime law requiring “contracts be interpreted in light of 
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custom and usage.”150 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that 
“because petitioners had cited no authority applying a federal 
maritime rule of custom and usage against class arbitration, the 
arbitrators’ decision was not in manifest disregard of federal 
maritime law”; and that the arbitrators had not “manifestly 
disregarded New York law,” which had no established rule 
against class arbitration.151 
The conservative majority held that imposing class 
arbitration on parties who have not explicitly agreed to 
authorize class arbitration is inconsistent with the Federal 
Arbitration Act.152 Justice Alito wrote that the arbitration panel 
“exceeded its powers” by imposing its own policy choice “instead 
of identifying and applying a rule of decision derived from the 
FAA or [from] maritime or New York law.”153 He asserted that 
the arbitration panel rested its decision on AnimalFeeds’s public 
policy argument for permitting class arbitration under the 
charter party’s arbitration clause instead of determining 
“whether the FAA, maritime, or New York law contain[ed] a 
‘default rule’ permitting an arbitration clause to allow class 
arbitration absent express consent.”154 
The majority acknowledged that under FAA § 10(b), it 
could direct a rehearing by the arbitrators on the issue, but it 
concluded that since there could be only one possible outcome 
based on the facts, there was no need to direct a rehearing by 
the arbitrators.155 
2. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
Here, the majority opinion was written by Justice 
Scalia.156 Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence and joined in the 
majority’s decision.157 Justice Breyer wrote the dissent.158 The 
decision was 5-4.159 
The cellular telephone contract between the Concepcions 
and AT&T “provided for arbitration of all disputes,” but did not 
permit classwide arbitration.160 After the Concepcions were 
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charged sales tax on the retail value of phones provided free 
under their service contract, they sued AT&T in a California 
federal district court.161 Their suit was consolidated with a class 
action alleging that AT&T “engaged in false advertising and 
fraud by charging sales tax” on “free” phones.162 The district 
court denied AT&T’s motion to compel arbitration. “[R]elying 
on the California Supreme Court’s [Discover Bank] decision,”163 
it found the arbitration provision unconscionable because it 
disallowed classwide proceedings.164 The Ninth Circuit agreed 
that the provision was unconscionable under California law 
and held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which makes 
arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, 
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract,” did not preempt its ruling.165 
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, which reversed 
in full. The majority concluded that because the Discover Bank 
rule “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress . . . [it] is pre-
empted by the FAA.”166 
B. Reviewing an Arbitrator’s Decision – Standard of Review 
In this section, the majority’s opinion in Stolt is 
analyzed with an eye toward the standard of review. In Stolt, the 
majority concluded that the arbitrators exceeded their authority 
in reaching their conclusion.167 The dissent criticized the majority 
for applying what the dissent characterized as a de novo review.168 
The dissent also pointed out that the Court reviewed the 
arbitrators’ decision despite the fact that it was not a final 
judgment.169 This section examines whether the majority 
deferred to the arbitrators as the law required, or if it instead 
sat as the arbitrator, engaging in the de novo review the 
dissent suggested.170 
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1. The Law Relating to Review of an Arbitrator’s 
Decision 
The most detailed description of how courts typically 
reviewed the award of an arbitrator prior to Stolt is, ironically, 
found in the Second Circuit decision handed down in Stolt that 
was ultimately reversed. The Second Circuit details that at law 
there were two paths recognized to overturn an arbitrator’s 
decision.171 The first set of reasons to overturn an arbitrator’s 
decision was rooted in Section 10 of the FAA.172 That section 
provides: 
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for 
the district wherein the award was made may make an order 
vacating the award upon the application of any party to the 
arbitration— 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue 
means; 
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators, or either of them; 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to 
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any 
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been 
prejudiced[.]173  
Courts have also recognized that an arbitrator’s award 
can be vacated if the arbitrator demonstrates a “manifest 
disregard for the law or exceeds his authority.”174 “Arbitrators 
exceed their powers when . . . they issue an award that is 
completely irrational.”175 Either way, both standards required 
extreme deference to the arbitrator. 
In fact, prior to the final decision in Stolt, the idea of 
overturning an arbitrator’s decision was somewhat novel. For 
example, the Second Circuit in Stolt summarized the law 
regarding the review of an arbitrator’s decision as follows: 
The party seeking to vacate an award on the basis of the arbitrator’s 
alleged “manifest disregard” of the law bears a heavy burden. Our 
review under the [judicially constructed] doctrine of manifest 
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disregard is severely limited. It is highly deferential to the arbitral 
award and obtaining judicial relief for arbitrators’ manifest 
disregard of the law is rare. The manifest disregard doctrine allows a 
reviewing court to vacate an arbitral award only in those exceedingly 
rare instances where some egregious impropriety on the part of the 
arbitrators is apparent.176 
The Second Circuit cited to other courts that suggested 
even more extreme deference to arbitrators. For example, the 
Seventh Circuit held: 
It is tempting to think that courts are engaged in judicial review of 
arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act, but they are 
not. When parties agree to arbitrate their disputes they opt out of 
the court system, and when one of them challenges the resulting 
arbitration award he perforce does so not on the ground that the 
arbitrators made a mistake but that they violated the agreement to 
arbitrate, as by corruption, evident partiality, exceeding their 
powers, etc.—conduct to which the parties did not consent when they 
included an arbitration clause in their contract. That is why in the 
typical arbitration, . . . the issue for the court is not whether 
the contract interpretation is incorrect or even wacky but whether 
the arbitrators had failed to interpret the contract at all, for only 
then were they exceeding the authority granted to them by 
the contract’s arbitration clause.177 
After reviewing the law, the Second Circuit landed on a 
deferential standard, holding that there need only be “a barely 
colorable justification for the outcome reached.”178 
This standard was not new, and had previously proved 
to be an almost insurmountable hurdle for those who sought to 
overturn an arbitrator’s decision. For example, in a previous 
opinion, the Second Circuit stated that since 1960 it considered 
arbitral awards in 48 cases, and vacated all or part of the 
award in only four.179 
The extreme deference shown to arbitrators should be 
anything but surprising to those who practice in the field. It is 
widely acknowledged by those who handle arbitrations that if a 
client loses in arbitration, the case is all but over.180 Courts 
generally do not second-guess arbitrators even when the 
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arbitrator’s decision is truly mindboggling. Instead, arbitration’s 
very efficiency has often been attributed to streamlined 
procedures and the fact that there is essentially no court 
review.181 Or as the Second Circuit articulated the rationale prior 
to Stolt, “[t]o interfere with [the arbitral] process would frustrate 
the intent of the parties, and thwart the usefulness of arbitration, 
making it the commencement, not the end, of litigation.”182 
It was based on this law that the Second Circuit held 
that the arbitration panel’s decision to allow class arbitration 
in Stolt was appropriate.183 The court reasoned that although 
there may be arguments against the interpretation given by 
the arbitration panel, it was certainly at least “colorable” and 
therefore passed muster.184 
2. The Majority’s Opinion Reviewing the Arbitration 
Panel’s Decision 
The majority opinion reversed the Second Circuit outright, 
and then concluded that although the Court certainly could send 
the case back to the arbitrators with guidance to apply the proper 
standard, there was no need because “there [was] only one 
possible outcome” under the facts.185 
Justice Alito began the majority analysis by explaining 
the general standard of review. 
It is not enough for petitioners to show that the panel committed an 
error—or even a serious error. It is only when an arbitrator strays 
from interpretation and application of the agreement and effectively 
dispenses his own brand of industrial justice that his decision may 
be unenforceable. In that situation, an arbitration decision may be 
vacated under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA on the ground that the 
arbitrator exceeded his powers, for the task of an arbitrator is to 
interpret and enforce a contract, not to make public policy.186 
It is worth noting here that the Court did not mention 
manifest disregard at all. Instead, the Court addressed manifest 
disregard only in a footnote, suggesting that it did not decide 
whether the standard of review survived, but then asserting 
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that if it did survive, the test was met.187 It characterized the 
manifest disregard test, based on AnimalFeeds’s brief, as 
requiring a showing that the arbitrators “knew of the relevant 
[legal] principle, appreciated that this principle controlled the 
outcome of the disputed issue, and nonetheless willfully flouted 
the governing law by refusing to apply it.”188 As such, in reversing 
the arbitration panel, the Court held that the arbitration panel 
“willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it.”189 
It did so by concluding that the panel rested its decision 
on a “public policy” argument, thereby exceeding its authority.190 
The Court stated that the arbitrators’ job was to look into the 
appropriate law to apply, but that it made no such undertaking.191 
The Court chastised the arbitrators for reading Green Tree 
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle192 as allowing for class arbitration 
and suggested that the arbitrators never looked at the FAA, 
maritime law, or New York law.193 
To reach its result, the Court noted that state law did not 
apply.194 This was a necessary move by the majority because state 
law might have allowed class arbitration (which allegedly would 
have violated the spirit of the FAA).195 With state law put aside, the 
majority held that no party could be coerced into class arbitration 
and found that the parties did not agree to class arbitration.196 
3. Analyzing the Conservative Majority’s Reasoning 
A close look at the majority opinion reveals it to be 
fundamentally flawed. As the dissent points out, it fails in at least 
three significant ways. First, it is essentially de novo review.197 
Second, the majority engaged in the review of an arbitral decision 
that was not a final judgment because the arbitrator had not even 
considered a motion for class certification yet, much less made 
any decisions on the merits.198 And third, rather than remanding 
the case to the arbitrator to decide the issue (even if one agrees 
 
 187 Id. at 1768 n.3. 
 188 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. at 1767-68. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
 193 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768-69 (2010). 
 194 Id. at 1773. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. at 1775. 
 197 Id. at 1777 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 198 Id. at 1778. 
2013] MIS-CONCEPCION  133 
the Court was right to vacate), the Court inserted its judgment, 
something the parties never agreed to.199 
The dissent also provides information that suggests that 
Justice Alito may have cherry-picked facts to support his 
argument. Indeed, the dissent points out that although the 
majority claims the arbitrators’ decision rested on “policy,” the 
word policy is “not so much as mentioned” in the arbitrators’ 
award.200 What is mentioned, in direct contradiction to Justice 
Alito’s fundamental reason for reversing the arbitration panel, is 
an explicit consideration of New York and maritime law.201 
Specifically, the dissent points out that far from ignoring these 
sources of law, the arbitration panel wrote that “[c]oncentrating 
on the wording of the arbitration clause . . . is consistent with 
New York law as articulated by the [New York] Court of 
Appeals . . . and with federal maritime law.”202 
Under the deferential review required, these facts alone 
should have ended the inquiry. The decision by the panel cannot 
be called wacky, and it certainly did not intentionally disregard 
the law. Instead, the contract interpretation decision appears 
reasonable. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to dive 
into the contract analysis fully, it is black letter contract law 
that ambiguous terms (such as “arbitration”) can be and are 
interpreted by decision makers.203 There is nothing improper 
about that. This fact, combined with even a common sense 
consideration of the case, suggests that there was at least a 
“colorable justification” for reading the arbitration clause to 
allow for class arbitration. 
After all, the parties were sophisticated entities. They had 
to know about class arbitration, and they should have known that 
only a few years earlier the United States Supreme Court 
suggested that class arbitration could be appropriate.204 In 
addition, the parties agreed to have their disputes resolved under 
the AAA Class Arbitration Rules. The willingness by Stolt to have 
the claim resolved in such a forum, and the stipulation that the 
clause was “silent” as to class arbitration—as opposed to 
prohibiting it—meant that the arbitrator certainly could have 
concluded that when the parties referred to “arbitration,” they 
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were referring to all arbitration, not just individual arbitration. 
This was supported all the more by the fact that the arbitration 
clause’s language was broad, covering “any dispute arising from 
the making, performance or termination of this Charter Party.”205 
As such, if the question the United States Supreme Court 
considered in Stolt was whether there was a “colorable 
justification” for the arbitration panel’s decision, then the panel’s 
express reference to appropriate facts and applicable law coupled 
with the common sense conclusion that the word “arbitration” 
might include all forms of arbitration should have been enough 
to affirm the decision. 
Affirming the Second Circuit should have been routine. 
This would have been in step with the purpose of arbitration—to 
avoid extensive judicial entanglement.206 Yet, here, after agreeing 
to let the arbitrator decide what the term “arbitration” meant, the 
majority allowed Stolt to back out of the deal, go to court, and 
obtain a de novo review.207 
To make sure the arbitration panel did not get any more 
ideas about making Stolt engage in class arbitration, the 
majority reversed in full rather than allowing the arbitration 
panel to consider the applicable law.208 These errors are hard to 
justify. If the Stolt case were a law school exam, it likely would 
have been considered by the professor administering it as one 
of the easier questions. But the majority got it wrong. 
4. Indicia of IR Are Present Throughout the Court’s 
Reasoning 
This section builds upon the analysis above by looking for 
indicia of IR. All six indicia noted in the introduction are found. 
a. Confirmation Bias 
The majority opinion is rife with examples of confirmation 
bias. As noted, the majority cherry-picked information about the 
dangers of class arbitration but failed to note the benefits.209 This 
included ignoring the potential efficiencies of class arbitration and 
ignoring the fact that many businesses view arbitration in 
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general as an efficient way to resolve significant disputes. 
Similarly, the majority ignores the fact that the parties stipulated 
to the class rules of AAA even though this suggests the parties 
knew that arbitration could include class arbitration.210 And 
finally, the Court chose small quotes from the arbitration panel 
to suggest that “policy” drove decision making, but failed to 
include portions of the award that suggested the panel 
considered the proper law.211 
b. Substitution 
The majority’s analysis also provides one of the clearest 
examples of substitution. In Stolt, the majority was supposed to 
be deciding whether the arbitration panel completely 
disregarded the facts and the law in reaching its conclusion.212 
The majority was supposed to consider the fact that even if the 
arbitrator got it wrong, that isn’t enough to reverse.213 In fact, the 
Court should have recognized that even if the arbitrators’ decision 
was only “colorable,” it was enough to withstand scrutiny.214 
However, after a quick recitation of these rules, the 
majority never mentioned them again.215 Instead, as the dissent 
suggests, the majority engaged in what was really a de novo 
review.216 This facilitated cognitive ease because it let the 
majority substitute an easy question for the much more difficult 
questions described above.217 Specifically, it let the majority ask, 
“Do we agree with the arbitration panel?” The answer was “no,” 
and so the majority vacated the arbitrators’ award. In keeping 
with the way substitution typically works,218 the majority did 
not acknowledge the switch. Instead, it plugged in the answer 
to the easy question as if it were the answer to a series of far 
more difficult ones. 
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c. Creation of My-Side Arguments 
As discussed, the majority built an impressive list of 
things the arbitration panel did wrong.219 However, the majority 
was unable to recognize the many things that the arbitration 
panel seemed to do right, such as considering maritime law and 
New York law, and engaging in a fair recitation of the facts and 
an application of general contractual principles regarding the 
interpretation of ambiguous terms. Given the appropriate 
standard of review, which required the majority to affirm if the 
arbitrator made a good faith effort to consider the law and the 
facts, the inability to list and consider “other-side”220 arguments 
led the majority to the wrong decision. 
d. Strained Reasoning 
Strained reasoning is the hardest indicia of IR to define 
precisely, but as the Supreme Court once famously wrote, “I 
know it when I see it.”221 At a minimum, strained reasoning 
collapses under logical consideration. It is certainly evident 
from the analysis above. 
For example, the majority suggested that the 
arbitration panel made a policy decision.222 Yet, to justify this 
conclusion the majority had to assert that the arbitration panel 
ignored various bodies of law and instead substituted its own 
“policy” judgment.223 In reality, the dissent demonstrated that the 
opposite was true: the arbitration panel specifically referenced the 
applicable law while never using the word “policy.”224 Similarly, 
the majority displayed an unwillingness to even decide on a 
standard of review. Rather than state whether or not “manifest 
disregard” is the official test, the majority relegated the 
standard to a footnote.225 It then asserted that the test for 
reversal, which it did not adopt or analyze, was met.226 It is 
strained reasoning to decide a case based on an undecided 
standard of review. 
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e. Persistence 
The majority opinion demonstrated persistence. The 
dissent pointed out that this was not a final judgment, that the 
majority was showing no deference to the arbitration panel, 
and that even the alleged justifications for the decision were 
belied by the factual record.227 But the majority was not swayed 
by the requirements for appellate review, the law, or any facts 
inconsistent with its conclusions.228 
f. Overconfidence 
The majority could have let the arbitrators consider the 
case in light of the Court’s guidance. Even if the majority 
thought the arbitrators applied the wrong law, it did not have to 
substitute its judgment for the arbitrators’, especially since the 
parties affirmatively agreed to have the question of what the 
word “arbitration” meant resolved by the panel.229 Yet, the Court 
vacated, holding that there was no other possible result.230 This 
is classic overconfidence. 
In sum, the scorecard for this section looks like this:  
 
Confirmation Bias  X 
Substitution  X 
Creation of “my-side” arguments  X 
Strained reasoning  X 
Persistence  X 
Overconfidence  X 
 
C. Preemption 
In this section, I examine the majority’s conclusion in 
Concepcion that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts 
California’s Discover Bank rule and can preempt some general 
contract law defenses.231 
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The Discover Bank rule was developed based on 
California’s unconscionability law.232 However, its primary 
application was to arbitration clauses. The rule invalidated a 
clause if it prohibited class actions in a context in which it was 
alleged that there was widespread illegality that resulted in 
small damages to each class member.233 The rule articulated 
these requirements, but it was rooted in the holding in Discover 
Bank that enforcing arbitration clauses in the consumer 
context when damages are small but the illegal behavior is 
class-wide would provide the defendant a “get-out-of-jail-free” 
card.234 In short, California concluded that class action waivers 
were unconscionable because they kept consumers, as a class, 
from pursuing their rights.235 
1. Scalia’s Preemption Analysis 
I now turn to the majority’s preemption analysis. When 
possible, the majority is not paraphrased so that there is no 
chance for distortion. However, it is worth noting at the outset 
that very little preemption law or preemption principles can be 
quoted from the majority opinion. Justice Scalia, writing for 
the majority, simply did not include them.236 Instead, Scalia 
began by acknowledging that the FAA contains a significant 
carve out from any preemptive power it might have. 
The final phrase of § 2, however, permits arbitration agreements to 
be declared unenforceable “upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.” This saving clause permits 
agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by “generally applicable 
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,” but 
not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their 
meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.237  
These preliminary statements are important because 
they recognize that the plain language of Section 2 contains a 
clear and unequivocal savings clause that allows states to 
refuse to enforce arbitration clauses if they run afoul of general 
state contract law.238 This is consistent with the idea that the 
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purpose of the FAA was to put arbitration clauses on “equal 
footing” with other contracts.239 Justice Scalia continued: 
When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular 
type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is 
displaced by the FAA. But the inquiry becomes more complex when a 
doctrine normally thought to be generally applicable, such as duress 
or, as relevant here, unconscionability, is alleged to have been applied 
in a fashion that disfavors arbitration. In Perry v. Thomas, for 
example, we noted that the FAA’s preemptive effect might extend even 
to grounds traditionally thought to exist “at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.” We said that a court may not “rely on the 
uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law 
holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would 
enable the court to effect what . . . the state legislature cannot.”240  
This is where things get interesting. Within a page of 
having acknowledged that the FAA allows for state law 
defenses, Justice Scalia articulated that perhaps even those 
defenses are subject to preemption.241 In keeping with this, he 
ultimately concluded that California’s Discover Bank rule is 
preempted because it falls too heavily on arbitration clauses.242 
He rejected the argument that although the rule is typically 
applied to arbitration clauses, it also applies to any contract 
that prohibits class actions regardless of whether or not the 
contract contains an arbitration clause.243 
Scalia asserted that “the overarching purpose of the 
FAA, evident in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms 
so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”244 Scalia rooted his 
conclusion in the text of the FAA, which he noted often refers to 
enforcing the terms of the arbitration agreement.245 Then, in an 
important moment, he argued with the dissent that the 
purpose of the FAA is more than just enforcing an agreement 
according to its terms. He asserted that it is clear that there is a 
second goal—to produce efficient resolution of disputes.246 He 
stated that “a prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to 
achieve streamlined proceedings and expeditious 
results . . . .”247 
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Having laid out these principles, Scalia concluded that 
“California’s Discover Bank rule . . . interferes with 
arbitration.”248 He asserted that the rule would essentially allow 
any consumer to demand class arbitration because the rule 
would work to strike the class action ban.249 He argued that the 
requirement that damages be small in order for the Discover 
Bank rule to apply is too malleable and that the requirement 
that there be assertions of class-wide harm means nothing 
because it only requires an allegation.250 He asserted that 
attorneys will no longer seek to resolve individual claims if 
they can resolve class claims and earn “higher fees.”251 He 
argued that businesses will no longer resolve individual claims 
either if they are faced with class arbitrations.252 
He also responded to the dissent’s assertion that enforcing 
the arbitration clause would prohibit consumers from pursuing 
their claims, because each would be forced to pursue a small 
dollar claim individually. He wrote: 
The dissent claims that class proceedings are necessary to prosecute 
small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip through the legal 
system. But States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent 
with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.253 
Based on these arguments, Justice Scalia concluded 
that “[b]ecause it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress, 
California’s Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA.”254 
2. Analysis 
Justice Scalia’s analysis has some serious holes. The 
first curious thing to note is that Justice Scalia did not cite the 
basic law addressing preemption. 
The basic law that one would have expected to find in the 
opinion is uncontroversial. When addressing questions of express 
or implied preemption, a court should begin its analysis 
“with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States 
[are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” That assumption applies 
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with particular force when Congress has legislated in a field 
traditionally occupied by the States. Thus, when the text of a 
preemption clause is susceptible of more than one plausible reading, 
courts ordinarily accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.255  
However, it is true that just because a clause contains a 
“savings clause,” exempting some areas of law from preemption, 
this does not mean that conflict preemption cannot be found. “We 
now conclude that the saving clause . . . does not bar the ordinary 
working of conflict preemption principles.”256 This is especially 
true if enforcing the savings clause would allow state law to 
interrupt complex federal regulation.257 
It is curious that none of this basic language appeared 
in the majority opinion at all. Since the law makes clear that 
preemption is especially inappropriate when (1) there is a direct 
savings clause;258 (2) the body of law being considered is a field 
typically left to states;259 or (3)  there is no reason to believe that 
the operation of state law would interfere with any federal 
regulatory scheme,260 and since in Concepcion each of these traits 
was present, failing to even mention them is hard to explain. 
However, giving Scalia and the majority their best day, 
perhaps they assumed that everyone knows the law, and so 
only an analysis regarding conflict preemption was needed. To 
this end, the majority held that although the savings clause 
would normally allow state contract law defenses, there was a 
risk that the clause would be read so broadly that it would conflict 
with the purpose of the FAA.261 There is some reasonableness to 
this argument. It is certainly true that too broad a reading of the 
savings clause could allow states to effectively prohibit all 
arbitration clauses by, for example, making it general state law 
that all disputes must be resolved by a jury or must allow for a 
full appeal. 
As a result, to determine the proper result in Concepcion, 
one must consider the purpose of the FAA and what result 
enforcing the Discover Bank rule would produce. In other words, 
does Discover Bank really conflict with the FAA? 
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The majority made clear what it believed the purpose of 
the FAA is by disputing the dissent’s position.262 Specifically, 
the majority argued that in addition to enforcing arbitration 
agreements, the FAA has a second goal—to promote the 
expeditious resolution of disputes.263 This recognition of the 
second goal is certainly more in line with the statute’s text. If the 
FAA were merely designed to enforce all arbitration clauses as 
written, there would be no need for a savings clause. The FAA 
could directly state that all arbitration clauses are enforceable, 
or at a minimum, the FAA could omit the savings clause. This 
did not happen, and that implies that the drafters of the FAA 
intended, at a minimum, to let states weed out especially 
offensive arbitration clauses. 
This also seems to be what the United States Supreme 
Court indicated in the past when it held that the FAA put 
arbitration clauses on equal footing with other contracts.264 In 
this framework, states retained the right to protect consumers 
from duress, unconscionability, and other basic defenses to 
contracts, but they could not generally view arbitration clauses, 
merely because they were arbitration clauses, with hostility. 
Taking the majority at its word then, the purpose of the 
FAA is to enforce arbitration agreements in order to encourage 
the efficient resolution of disputes.265 If this is true, all that 
remains is to determine if the Discover Bank rule somehow 
thwarted this purpose. 
The Discover Bank rule allowed for class arbitration.266 
So, as a starting point, it is a given that if the majority had 
enforced the Discover Bank rule, then the case would have 
proceeded to arbitration with the possibility of class certification. 
To be fair, certification was not guaranteed, as the class 
arbitrators consider all the typical class action factors in 
considering a motion for class certification, and the burden of 
proving the elements rests with the party filing the arbitration.267 
But, assuming the class was certified and either a settlement 
was reached or a decision was reached by the arbitrator, the 
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claims of thousands, or maybe hundreds of thousands of people, 
would have been resolved. 
As a result, enforcing the Discover Bank rule would 
have encouraged the efficient resolution of disputes in many 
consumer claims involving small damages and allegations of 
widespread fraud. Conversely, the majority’s decision guaranteed 
that any dispute that was resolved would be resolved 
individually, and it guaranteed that tens of thousands of claims, 
if resolved at all, would have taken tens of thousands of 
arbitrations and arbitrators, instead of just one. Of course, in 
truth, it also guaranteed that most claims would never be 
resolved at all, as individuals will rarely pursue claims for 
small amounts of money due to a variety of factors including 
the cost of an attorney, missed work time, travel time, and the 
very limited potential reward for the effort spent.268 
Consequently, the second goal, of encouraging the efficient 
resolution of disputes, weighs in favor of enforcing the Discover 
Bank rule, not striking it down. 
Scalia might counter that class arbitration is not 
efficient. However, this argument does not hold water. 
According to data in Concepcion, the average class arbitration 
takes about 600 days, whereas the average in-person 
individual arbitration takes about six months.269 Reason 
dictates then, that 10 individual arbitrations would require 60 
months of arbitrator time (and 10 arbitrators in most cases), 
whereas resolving the claims of 10,000 individuals in class 
arbitration would take about 20 months (and one to three 
arbitrators, depending on the rules). It is tough to justify 
demanding individual arbitration in the name of efficiency. 
Based on the facts, the result is not in doubt. By 
enforcing AT&T’s arbitration clause as written, Justice Scalia 
squelched the efficient resolution of thousands or hundreds of 
thousands of claims.270 He ensured that even if AT&T were 
 
 268 There is good evidence that consumers cannot pursue individual 
arbitrations in a small damage setting. For example, in a case in which I was lead 
counsel, discovery revealed that a payday lender who was charging over 400% interest 
on loans had over 200,000 customers. See Woods v. QC Fin. Servs., Inc., 280 S.W.3d 90, 
98 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008). The arbitration clause prohibited class actions. The business 
had never engaged in a single arbitration. Experts in the case testified that consumers 
would never find representation for claims of only a few hundred dollars. A Missouri 
court struck the class action waiver as unconscionable because it would keep people 
from pursuing claims. This is still the law of Missouri, but under AT&T, that law can 
no longer apply to arbitration clauses, meaning they are on decidedly unequal footing 
from other contracts. 
 269 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751. 
 270 Id. at 1759-60. 
144 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1 
breaking the law, it would not answer to most of the people it 
harmed. He fractionalized what resolution would occur into 
individual arbitrations that will be private so that there is no 
precedent for others to follow and there is no reporting of the 
result that could encourage others to pursue their claims. And 
finally, since not all consumers know the law, by eliminating a 
chance for class notice, Justice Scalia ensured that most 
consumers would simply remain in the dark, with no knowledge 
that their rights may have been violated. 
Justice Scalia and the majority did all this in the name 
of enforcing the purpose of the FAA.271 But it is hardly 
consistent with the goal of encouraging the resolution of 
disputes to stop the resolution of disputes. It is also strange that 
although Justice Scalia lauds the efficiency of individual 
arbitration,272 his decision guaranteed that individual 
arbitrations will not occur. 
Concepcion is also unsound from another perspective. 
Justice Scalia, as mentioned early in this article, claims to be a 
textual originalist.273 He derides those who would put the 
purpose they ascribe to an act over the actual text of the act. 
Yet, he does just that. The text of the FAA explicitly exempts 
general state contract law defenses from preemption.274 As 
such, the purpose of the FAA cannot merely be to enforce all 
arbitration clauses. Instead, the purpose is to enforce clauses 
when they are consistent with general state contract law.275 
Similarly, the purpose is limited, as Scalia admitted, by the 
desire to encourage the resolutions of disputes, not to stymy 
them.276 Yet, Justice Scalia used the “purpose” of the FAA to 
override its plain language. He held that because the FAA says 
it does not preempt general state contract law, it sometimes 
does.277 Reading the purpose of the law to be something other 
than what its text states is a difficult decision for a textual 
originalist to defend. 
It should also be noted that in order to reach the 
conclusion that what California asserts as general state 
contract law is not really general state contract law, and is 
instead a law that is hostile only to arbitration, the majority 
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had to second-guess the California legislature and the 
California Supreme Court. It is hard to imagine a reading of 
the FAA that puts federal judges in the position of deciding 
what state law really is. It is even stranger that Scalia, a 
states’ rights advocate, engaged in such second-guessing.278 
These inconsistencies did not escape the dissent. Justice 
Breyer wrote: 
The Federal Arbitration Act says that an arbitration agreement 
“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 
U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added). California law sets forth certain 
circumstances in which “class action waivers” in any contract are 
unenforceable. In my view, this rule of state law is consistent with 
the federal Act’s language and primary objective. It does not “stan[d] 
as an obstacle” to the Act’s “accomplishment and execution.”279 
Justice Breyer also explained that by striking down the 
Discover Bank rule, Justice Scalia did the opposite of what the 
plain language of Section 2 requires. “[I]nsofar as we seek to 
implement Congress’ intent, we should think more than twice 
before invalidating a state law that does just what § 2 requires, 
namely, puts agreements to arbitrate and agreements to litigate 
‘upon the same footing.’”280 
In sum, the majority’s discussion regarding conflict 
preemption failed to set out the appropriate preemption law. 
The majority also reached a conclusion at war with its own 
stated rules. While professing that arbitration clauses should 
be on equal footing with other contracts, Concepcion privileges 
arbitration clauses in California, ensuring that in the future, a 
class action waiver in an arbitration clause will be treated 
differently than the same clause in a contract.281 Similarly, 
Justice Scalia, who believes in focusing on the actual language 
of a statute, managed to use the “purpose” of the statute to 
overrule its own text, causing one to wonder how the purpose 
can be different than the plain language. 
These fundamental flaws in reasoning suggest that on 
the issue of preemption, the majority got the question almost 
entirely wrong. The decision reflects a significant departure from 
existing preemption precedent, it runs afoul of the plain language 
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of the very FAA that the majority says it is relying upon, and it 
ignores the upside down results the decision produces. 
3. Indicia of IR Abound 
a. Confirmation Bias 
The confirmation bias is probably most evident in 
Justice Scalia’s failure to include any of the law about 
preemption that would have undercut his arguments. As 
discussed above, there is a significant body of law that would 
suggest preemption is disfavored based on the facts of 
Concepcion. At a minimum, one would have expected the 
majority opinion to at least confront this law. Justice Scalia does 
not. Instead, his opinion gravitated toward anything and 
everything that could be used to support his result. Similarly, 
when discussing the inefficiencies of class arbitration, Justice 
Scalia picked only facts that support his argument while 
completely failing to consider or acknowledge data that suggest 
class arbitration is more efficient than class actions or that a 
single class arbitration is more efficient than multiple individual 
claims about the same underlying facts. 
b. Substitution 
The preemption issue required the majority to ask a 
number of questions. For example, the majority should have asked: 
1)  Is this an issue that relates to a field typically policed by states? 
2) Does the FAA contain a savings clause? 
3) Is there any federal regulatory scheme that the Discover Bank 
rule interferes with? 
4) What is the purpose of the FAA? 
5) What impact will the Discover Bank rule have on the FAA’ s 
purpose? 
6) Is it possible that class arbitration will serve the FAA’s purpose? 
7) What does our past arbitration precedent teach about how to 
handle a clause that, if enforced, will ensure some people cannot 
pursue their claims?  
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Instead, it appears the majority simply asked, “Do 
businesses like class arbitration,” and then answered with a 
definitive “no.”282 This provides an explanation for why the 
majority dove headfirst into describing the problems with class 
arbitration and then concluded that enforcing the Discover Bank 
rule would be unacceptable. The majority concluded that 
businesses do not want to go to class arbitration and substituted 
that as an answer to a series of far more difficult questions 
about preemption.283 
c. Creation of My-Side Arguments 
With relation to preemption, the majority did not 
produce a significant number of “my-side” arguments. Instead, 
it provided very little direct support for preemption at all. The 
only exception is the majority’s list of all the ways that class 
arbitration is fundamentally different from bilateral 
arbitration.284 This list of my-side arguments is discussed in the 
following section, which focuses exclusively on the majority’s 
treatment of class arbitration in both decisions. 
d. Strained Reasoning 
The clearest example of strained reasoning in 
Concepcion is Justice Scalia’s abandonment of his own 
principles. When a textual originalist overrules the text of an 
act, thereby turning an act that is anti-preemptive on its face into 
a preemptive one, IR is apparent. There is no explanation for how 
a carve out for states’ rights could lead to a conclusion that the 
FAA preempts states’ rights other than the fact that the majority 
engaged in its reasoning only after it reached its decision. 
There is also a fundamental inconsistency in the 
majority’s reasoning. Although it argued that the goal of the 
FAA is to put arbitration clauses on an equal footing with 
contracts, in reality, the decision privileges arbitration clauses. 
California law explicitly allowed for a determination that any 
contract or clause within it was unconscionable; this was 
generally applicable law that could apply to arbitration clauses 
but did not target them.285 Yet, after Concepcion, if a business 
prohibits class actions in an arbitration clause, the provision is 
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enforceable. If the same company were to ban class actions in a 
contract, the provision would fail. As such, the majority opinion 
violates its own guidelines by favoring arbitration clauses. 
e. Persistence 
Persistence is especially prevalent in the majority’s 
consideration of preemption. The dissent forcefully pointed out 
that the majority’s decision (1) will stop people from resolving 
disputes, and (2) is in conflict with a plain reading of the 
statute.286 The majority said the first concern does not matter and 
never even addressed the second issue. The majority’s inability to 
meaningfully consider points that reasonably challenged the 
alleged rationale for its opinion is a classic marker of IR. 
f. Overconfidence 
The majority’s opinion displays a certitude that is hard 
to justify. Perhaps the most telling sign of overconfidence is the 
majority’s need to state that many class actions are in 
terrorem.287 The assertion that many class actions are just a way 
to extort money from businesses through frivolous claims is 
completely unnecessary in the case. If the majority knew that its 
result was shaky, it would almost certainly avoid any language 
that would suggest that the opinion was driven by a bias 
against class claims. However, the majority was so convinced 
that its reasoning was sound that it included superfluous 
language. This displays the majority’s lack of awareness of the 
logical fallacies in its argument. 
In the end, the scorecard looks like this: 
 
Confirmation Bias  X  
Substitution  X  
Creation of “my-side” arguments   
Strained reasoning  X  
Persistence  X  
Overconfidence  X  
 
 
 286 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1757-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 287 Id. at 1752 (majority opinion). 
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D. The Majority’s Unsupported Remarks Regarding 
Arbitration 
In both Stolt and Concepcion, the majority discussed (1) 
why class arbitration is so fundamentally different from 
arbitration, and (2) why a business could not possibly desire 
class arbitration.288 In making these arguments, the majority 
departs from reasoning that is supported by the facts, providing 
some of the starkest examples of IR. 
1. The Majority’s Statements Regarding Class 
Arbitration and Class Actions 
The majority began its critique of class arbitration in 
Stolt. Close on its heels came Concepcion, which, relatively 
gratuitously, returned to the topic of class arbitration. Along the 
way, the majority also managed to assert that class actions are 
often frivolous and an unfair burden to businesses.289 
a. The Majority’s Assertions in Stolt 
In Stolt, Justice Alito wrote for the majority that “[a]n 
implicit agreement to authorize class-action arbitration, 
however, is not a term that the arbitrator may infer solely from 
the fact of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.”290 In doing so, as 
discussed above, he took the issue away from the arbitrator, 
where the parties agreed it would be decided, and made it an 
issue for the Court to decide. He supported his assertion that 
class arbitration can never be inferred from the word arbitration 
by suggesting that class arbitration changes the very “nature of 
arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the 
parties consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their 
disputes to an arbitrator.”291 Alito explained further: 
In bilateral arbitration, parties forgo the procedural rigor and 
appellate review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of private 
dispute resolution: lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the 
ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes. 
But the relative benefits of class-action arbitration are much less 
assured, giving reason to doubt the parties’ mutual consent to resolve 
disputes through class wide arbitration. 
 
 288 Id. at 1750-51; Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 
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Consider just some of the fundamental changes brought about by the 
shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitration. An 
arbitrator chosen according to an agreed-upon procedure no longer 
resolves a single dispute between the parties to a single agreement, 
but instead resolves many disputes between hundreds or perhaps even 
thousands of parties. Under the Class Rules, “the presumption of 
privacy and confidentiality” that applies in many bilateral arbitrations 
“shall not apply in class arbitrations,” thus potentially frustrating the 
parties’ assumptions when they agreed to arbitrate. The arbitrator’s 
award no longer purports to bind just the parties to a single 
arbitration agreement, but adjudicates the rights of absent parties 
as well. And the commercial stakes of class-action arbitration are 
comparable to those of class-action litigation even though the scope 
of judicial review is much more limited.292  
The quoted text above, giving the majority its fair due, 
identifies three specific reasons why class arbitration is so 
different that it would be irrational to assume any party would 
ever agree to it. (The majority actually lists four, but the first and 
third—that the arbitrator considers and decides the claims of 
more than one person—are exactly the same thing.) 
The issues identified are: 
1) An arbitrator “no longer resolves a single dispute.” Instead, the 
decision could apply to hundreds or thousands of disputes.293 
2) Under the class rules, there is less of a presumption of privacy 
and this could frustrate the will of the parties.294 
3) The stakes of a class arbitration are like those of a class action, 
but there is less judicial review of a class arbitration.295  
b. Analyzing the Majority’s Assertions in Stolt 
The first thing that may jump out at a reader is that 
while the majority couched its concerns about class arbitration 
in terms of frustrating the intent of the parties, what the 
majority really meant is that they will frustrate the defendant. 
The plaintiff in this case was asking for class arbitration, 
suggesting it would not have been frustrated at all. Below, each 
alleged problem with class arbitration is considered in turn. 
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 293 Id. at 1776. 
 294 Id. 
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 i. Resolution of Multiple Disputes 
As discussed in the section relating to preemption, 
arguing that resolving multiple claims at once is somehow 
worse than resolving individual claims one-by-one is strange. If 
it is true that the goal of the FAA is to enforce agreements to 
facilitate informal, streamlined proceedings, then why would it 
be assumed that when a party refers to arbitration, that party 
can never mean arbitration of more than one dispute at a time? 
At a sheer mathematical level, class arbitration is far more 
efficient at resolving disputes than individual arbitration. 
But the majority might respond by suggesting that 
although it may be good policy to encourage class arbitration, 
what matters is what the parties intended. Does this argument 
win the day? If we are to assume that the parties included an 
arbitration clause in order to resolve disputes quickly and 
efficiently, then why would we assume the parties eschewed 
class arbitration? This assumption seems even stranger given 
that class arbitration was becoming common by the time Stolt 
was decided, meaning parties certainly must have known it 
existed. In the end, the assertion that no one could think 
arbitration includes class arbitration is dubious at best. 
ii. The Presumption of Privacy Is Eroded in Class 
Arbitration 
Justice Alito suggested that the lack of privacy could 
“potentially” frustrate the parties.296 This tepid statement was 
as far as he could go. In truth, not all parties demand privacy 
in arbitration and although AAA rules require the publication 
of the class action complaint and final award, they do not 
require the publication of most documents, including the most 
potentially sensitive documents, such as dispositive motions or 
motions for class certification.297 Similarly, the right to seal 
documents exists in arbitration, just as it does in court. As a 
result, the suggestion that the parties “potentially” could be 
worried about privacy is largely advisory. 
Alito’s focus on the potential frustration of the actual 
parties in Stolt was especially strange. This is because in Stolt, 
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the parties agreed to have their dispute resolved under the 
AAA Class Arbitration Rules.298 Those rules provide for limited 
disclosures.299 Apparently, neither of the parties was troubled 
by this because if they were, they did not have to stipulate to it. 
Why, then, did Justice Alito step in and express a concern the 
parties did not and could not have had? 
Finally, the willingness to worry about “potential” 
problems, even though they were not proven, is new to the 
Court. In a previous case, the Court was asked to invalidate an 
arbitration clause that required a mobile home purchaser to 
arbitrate.300 In that case, the plaintiff argued that the costs of 
arbitration could overwhelm her and prevent her from pursing 
her statutory rights.301 The Court rejected her challenge, 
holding that “[t]he ‘risk’ that [Plaintiff] will be saddled with 
prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation of 
an arbitration agreement.”302 Why is an individual plaintiff’s 
fear of high arbitration costs speculative if the invented fears of 
a company like Stolt are sufficient to merit the Court’s 
attention? In the end, the majority’s concerns about limited 
privacy prove more fiction than fact. 
iii. The Stakes Are High in Class Arbitration and 
There Is Not Sufficient Judicial Review 
The final concern about class arbitration is that there is 
simply no way businesses would agree to class arbitration 
because it is not subject to judicial review but could involve 
large sums of money.303 This argument is probably the hardest 
of the trilogy of less-than-convincing reasons to defend. First, 
the mere assertion that arbitration is insufficient to handle 
some claims was roundly rejected as a losing argument in 
Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson, in which the Court struck down a 
challenge to an arbitration clause, explaining that concerns 
about the arbitrator’s qualification, lack of process, or discovery 
were inconsistent with the FAA.304 As such, when the majority 
argued that the stakes are too high in class arbitration, it is 
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essentially stating a position hostile to arbitration, and this is a 
position the same majority has consistently said is preempted 
by the FAA.305 
There are additional concerns. The majority implicitly 
expresses a belief that class arbitration is almost never 
attractive to businesses because it would require risking too 
much with too little judicial review.306 This is an inherently 
biased position. The majority is concerned that businesses would 
never agree to class arbitration given the stakes, but where was 
this reasoning in any case in which an individual was being 
compelled to arbitrate? 
Assume a female is fired from her job. She believes it is 
because she refused to have sex with her manager. She wants 
to sue to either get her job back or recover damages because 
she cannot find work and has two kids. However, the employer 
asked her to sign an arbitration clause when she began 
working. It applies to “any and all disputes.” 
Can anyone honestly suggest that for this mother, the 
stakes of her arbitration are lower than those of the parties in 
Stolt? She gets one shot at her claim. Winning might be the 
difference between long-term unemployment (and all that comes 
with it) and gainful employment. The arbitrator might not be 
that qualified. There is no meaningful judicial review. Discovery 
might be limited. And if anything goes wrong, she has no other 
options for pursing her rights. Yet, the Supreme Court has 
routinely held that these concerns, far from being barriers to 
enforcing the clause, are actually questions that are hostile to 
arbitration and are therefore preempted. If the stakes do not 
matter when the party is a person, why do they matter when 
the party is a business? 
In any event, even if there is reason to have sympathy 
for businesses that might lose too much in class arbitration, the 
assumption that no business would agree to high stakes 
arbitration is simply unsupportable. Many businesses view 
arbitration as a reasonable forum where large claims can be 
resolved once and for all.307 The growth of international 
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arbitration to resolve business disputes is well documented.308 
Justice Breyer pointed out other examples.309 For example, he 
noted in his dissent that several businesses voluntarily entered 
into arbitrations in which the stakes exceeded $500 million and 
in one case topped $1 billion.310 
In the end, the majority’s concerns about the risks of 
class arbitration reveal more about the majority than about 
class arbitration. The reasons given for conclusively holding that 
no business would ever read the word “arbitration” to include 
class arbitration are unsound and unpersuasive. 
c. The Majority’s Statements about Class Arbitration in 
Concepcion 
The majority returned to its discussion of class 
arbitration in Concepcion. While making some of the same 
observations as in Stolt, Justice Scalia took the opportunity to 
add a few new statements about class arbitration. He asserted 
that “the switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the 
principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes 
the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate 
procedural morass than final judgment.”311 He argued that this 
is true because in class arbitration the arbitrator has to decide 
whether the class will be certified, whether the named parties 
are sufficiently representative (which is actually just one of the 
elements of class certification), and how discovery will occur.312 
The first two concerns articulated by Scalia are the 
same thing said two different ways; both relate to the need for 
the arbitrator to decide if class certification is appropriate. The 
fact that the arbitrator engages in rigorous analysis as to 
whether class certification is appropriate is only a concern if 
one agrees with Justice Scalia that making sure a class is 
appropriate, as opposed to certifying all cases as class actions, is 
somehow harmful to businesses. Of course, in reality, the very 
mechanisms Justice Scalia criticized actually provide procedural 
safeguards. Similar procedural matters can and do occur in 
individual arbitrations. For example, motions to compel 
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discovery, motions to dismiss, and even motions for partial 
summary judgment are entertained in some complex individual 
arbitrations.313 
The next concern articulated by Scalia is that the 
arbitrator must oversee discovery.314 However, this is no different 
than in many individual arbitrations. For example, some 
individual arbitrations are between two giant, multinational 
companies. These will often involve a panel of three arbitrators 
and have complex rules for administering the claim.315 Justice 
Scalia omitted this information. 
As mentioned previously, he suggested that a “cursory” 
review of bilateral versus class arbitration reveals that class 
arbitration takes longer.316 He complained that no AAA class 
arbitrations, at the time Concepcion was handed down, had 
resulted in final judgments.317 These are strange criticisms. 
First, the amount of time spent per claim resolved is obviously 
lower in class arbitrations. If a class arbitration resolved a 
meager 100 claims in 600 days, that is six days per claim. There 
was no evidence that any individual arbitration lasts only six 
days; instead, evidence before the Court suggested that the 
average individual arbitration takes six months.318 The dissent 
also provided reason to believe Scalia’s data was incomplete. 
The dissent pointed to AAA’s amicus brief in Concepcion, in 
which AAA provided proof that class arbitrations are resolved 
faster than class actions in courts.319 This apples-to-apples 
comparison, instead of comparing an individual arbitration to a 
class arbitration, suggests that class arbitration provides the 
same efficiencies that individual arbitration does. 
But the majority opinion ignored all of this. Just as in 
Stolt, the majority’s errors seem to derive from the fact that the 
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majority focused exclusively on the defendants’ perspective, not 
on the claimant and class, all of whom would almost certainly 
be happier with class arbitration. 
Justice Scalia also bemoaned the fact that class 
arbitration “requires procedural formality.”320 Specifically, he cited 
the fact that the class would need to receive class notice.321 
Besides the fact that class notice often lets people recover 
damages without participating in the day-to-day litigation of the 
case—the most efficient resolution of claims possible—it is also a 
safeguard for all involved. Class notice lets people object to bad 
settlements, and it lets people who do not want to be involved in a 
lawsuit against a business opt out. In this light, Justice Scalia’s 
concern with procedural formality was at war with the majority’s 
criticism in Stolt—namely that businesses were being asked to 
risk too much with too little protection. In the end, the majority 
criticized class arbitration on the one hand for having too much 
procedure, and on the other hand, for having too little. 
But these concerns were merely precursors. It is Scalia’s 
“third” set of concerns, as he numbers them, that is most 
confounding. Justice Scalia overtly stated that “class arbitration 
greatly increases risks to defendants. Informal procedures do of 
course have a cost: The absence of multilayered review makes it 
more likely that errors will go uncorrected.”322 This criticism, that 
businesses will be at risk, echoes the criticism Justice Alito 
raised in Stolt. It is, by all measures, inappropriate. For two 
decades before Concepcion, the Court explicitly prohibited 
individuals from suggesting arbitration was not a good place to 
resolve some claims.323 
The Court, including Justice Scalia, suggested that such 
challenges to the very nature of arbitration were preempted by 
the FAA, as they demonstrated hostility toward arbitration. 
Yet, when Justice Scalia feared that businesses might be forced 
to face the realities of arbitration, he openly conceded that 
arbitration can cause errors and then sought to let the business 
escape from the very system he previously lauded. 
Scalia’s inconsistencies did not stop there. He then 
suggested that because businesses could seek appellate review of 
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class certification in court under a de novo review, but under 
arbitration rules the review would be severely limited, businesses 
are further prejudiced. He argued that the Court can almost 
never effectively review an arbitration decision because it must 
show extreme deference to the arbitrator. This irony is 
palpable. In Stolt, issued only one year earlier, the Court 
vacated an arbitrator’s decision, showing seemingly no deference 
at all. It is equally ironic that the very thing that Justice Scalia 
previously said makes arbitration efficient (lack of judicial 
involvement) quickly became one of his arguments for why 
businesses should not have to arbitrate at all. 
In all, the majority’s treatment of class arbitration is 
shifting sand. The majority suggested businesses would never 
choose class arbitration despite proof that they do so all the 
time.324 The majority simultaneously lamented the lack of 
procedural review in class arbitration and then criticized its 
procedural protections relating to class certification.325 The 
majority asserted that class arbitration is inefficient, but then 
failed to compare class arbitration to class actions in court, 
instead comparing it to the resolution of one individual claim. 
These inconsistencies, and many more, suggest that something 
besides cold rationality is going on in the decisions. 
2. Markers of IR 
a. Confirmation Bias 
Confirmation bias consumes the majority’s discussion of 
class arbitration. For example, the majority focused on statistics 
provided by AAA to prove class arbitration takes longer than an 
individual arbitration.326 Although these facts, presented in 
isolation, might support the majority’s conclusion, it is clear the 
majority ignored the other statistics, also from AAA, that noted 
that class arbitrations were faster than class actions.327 
Similarly, Scalia’s decision to criticize class arbitration 
for having procedural safeguards like discovery or a class 
certification hearing was illogical. The conservative majority 
suggested in Stolt and again in Concepcion that one of the 
problems with class arbitration was that businesses were not 
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protected.328 Under this logic, giving a business real discovery and 
requiring the plaintiff to prove all the elements of class 
certification would ensure a fairer result. And for this reason, 
this extra “procedure” should be a positive. Scalia did not see 
this. Instead, he was focused on anything that might support 
his argument. 
The same is true of the lists of “facts” about class 
arbitration that were provided by the majority. The first 
explained why no business would choose class arbitration. The 
second list is similar, and detailed just how different class 
arbitration is from bilateral arbitration. The first list 
completely ignored the potential benefits of resolving large 
claims quickly and with arbitrators specifically trained in the 
area of law at issue. The second list ignored a host of ways that 
class arbitration is exactly like bilateral arbitration. 
Finally, the majority grasped for supporting arguments 
in Concepcion when criticizing characteristics of arbitration, 
such as an arbitrator’s potential lack of understanding of the 
law or subject matter and the lack of the right to a full appeal. 
As discussed, the Court explicitly rejected these arguments in 
earlier decisions. They should have been preempted, as they 
express hostility toward arbitration. 
b. Substitution 
The Court, to its credit, does not engage in substitution 
when talking about class arbitration. 
c. Creation of “My-Side” Arguments 
Some of the most obvious examples of creating “my-side” 
arguments exist in the discussion of class arbitration. As 
discussed, in Stolt the majority produced a list of four different 
things about class arbitration that made it unlikely anyone 
would agree to it. However, an examination of the list reveals 
that one reason was listed twice (that the arbitrator considers 
and decides the claims of more than one person), another was a 
concern that the parties could not reasonably have (that class 
arbitration could allow the disclosure of some information 
about the arbitration), and the third was inherently biased and 
inaccurate (that the company just has too much to lose to ever 
agree to class arbitration). As cognitive science predicts, smart 
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people like the members of the majority are adept at producing 
ever-longer lists of support for their beliefs, but they are not 
good at producing or considering “other-side” arguments.329 
This one-sided discussion of the merits of arbitration is 
painfully obvious because even spending a few minutes 
thinking about class arbitration reveals a bevy of reasons a 
business might chose it. For example, unlike in court, parties 
in arbitration are able to vet arbitrators at AAA.330 They can 
strike people they think would be unfair after reviewing their 
resumes and the cases they have worked on in the past. 
Similarly, many businesses might benefit from finality instead 
of prolonged litigation costs. And certainly the somewhat 
limited nature of discovery in arbitration could actually benefit 
a business that is facing a class action. Similarly, Justice Alito 
never acknowledged that AAA requires all arbitrators who 
handle class arbitrations be specially trained in this area, 
unlike courts, which do not require judges be specifically 
trained in class action litigation to handle such cases in court. 
Justice Scalia engaged in the same one-sided argument 
creation in Concepcion. He provided a list of all the ways that 
class arbitration fundamentally changes arbitration.331 Yet, he 
did not acknowledge even one of the ways that class arbitration 
is identical to bilateral arbitration (unless it was to suggest 
that suddenly the trait was bad). For example, he could have 
created an “other-side” list that recognized the following 
similarities between bilateral arbitration and class arbitration: 
less formal rules of evidence, arbitrators trained in the specific 
field that the case involves, narrower discovery, limited judicial 
review, lack of precedent, informal hearings (including phone 
hearings, etc.), and faster resolution times than similar cases 
in court. If Justice Scalia had acknowledged how very similar 
class arbitration is to individual arbitration, the analysis might 
have been much different. 
d. Strained Reasoning 
Strained reasoning appeared throughout the discussion of 
class arbitration. It appeared when Justice Alito asserted that 
businesses hate arbitration when it is high stakes but failed to 
mention that some businesses choose arbitration to resolve 
 
 329 HAIDT, supra note 12, at 80-81. 
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 331 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 
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enormous business-to-business disputes.332 Similarly, faulty 
reasoning occurs when the majority carefully considered the risks 
businesses face in class arbitration, but never considered the risks 
individuals face when their entire claim is before an arbitrator. 
Strained reasoning occurred when the court invented arguments 
for businesses (like concerns about privacy that could not have 
been present in Stolt) or when it actually criticized class 
arbitration for having procedural safeguards but then argued 
class arbitration is bad precisely because it does not have more 
procedural safeguards in the form of appeals. Similar 
contradictions occurred when the majority criticized class 
arbitration for resolving multiple claims at once, while 
simultaneously arguing that the purpose of the FAA is to promote 
efficient resolution of claims. And one cannot help but wonder 
how the majority can argue that arbitrators might not be 
qualified to handle class arbitration when this argument (1) was 
not only hostile to arbitration and therefore preempted but also 
(2) completely ignored the fact that some courts are unqualified 
whereas arbitrators at AAA are trained in class arbitration. 
e. Persistence 
The dissent pointed out that class arbitration is faster 
than a class action and that in the absence of class arbitration, 
consumers will not resolve their disputes at all, much less 
efficiently do so.333 The majority never even addressed the first 
point, and as for the second, it suggested that it does not matter 
whether consumers can vindicate their rights, because even a 
concern like that cannot get in the way of enforcing the purpose of 
the FAA.334 This provides another example of when a thoughtful 
counterargument is totally ignored, consistent with IR. 
f. Overconfidence 
Although it is clear the majority thinks it is right, there is 
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 333 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 334 Id. 
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In the end, the scorecard looks like this: 
 
Confirmation Bias  X  
Substitution   
Creation of “my-side” arguments  X  
Strained reasoning  X  
Persistence  X  
Overconfidence   
 
E. Concepcion Overrules Past Precedent, But It Never 
Acknowledges It  
This section briefly outlines the “vindication of rights” 
doctrine that existed in Supreme Court decisions since at least 
1985.335 This section concludes that although the vindication of 
rights doctrine would have suggested that the Discover Bank 
rule was legally appropriate, Justice Scalia did not even 
mention it. This section also concludes that his decision 
effectively overrules the vindication of rights doctrine. This is 
problematic because Justice Scalia was part of the majority 
who recognized the doctrine in the past. 336 
1. Vindication of Rights 
As late as the 1970s, the United States Supreme Court 
treated arbitration as appropriate to resolve contract disputes 
in the labor setting, but inappropriate for almost anything else. 
For example, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, the Court held 
that “if an arbitral decision is based solely upon the arbitrator’s 
view of the requirements of enacted legislation, rather than on 
an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement, the 
arbitrator has exceeded the scope of the submission.”337 In other 
words, an arbitrator was not supposed to serve as an interpreter 
of complex statutory law; an arbitrator was limited to deciding 
the rules of the shop.338 This led the Court to the conclusion that 
 
 335 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
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even if an employee arbitrated discrimination claims, the 
employee was still free to pursue those claims in Court, as courts 
were the final word on such important issues.339 
This view held sway until the 1980s and was not fully 
eradicated until 1991—the date when the Supreme Court 
began to regularly demonstrate its adoration of arbitration. It 
was then that Gardner-Denver was essentially overruled. This 
happened in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., in which 
the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether it should 
enforce an arbitration clause that would require the plaintiff, a 
securities trader, to arbitrate his employment dispute.340 In the 
opinion, the Court specifically rejected assertions that the 
arbitrator might be biased, that discovery was too limited in 
arbitration, and that the lack of a written opinion was 
problematic.341 Instead, the Court strongly held that claims, even 
serious ones, could be resolved in arbitration.342 In a footnote, 
the Court implicitly overruled Gardner-Denver. It wrote: 
The Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., . . . expressed the 
view that arbitration was inferior to the judicial process for resolving 
statutory claims. That mistrust of the arbitral process, however, has 
been undermined by our recent arbitration decisions. We are well 
past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of 
arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the 
development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute 
resolution.343 
For support, the Court cited to Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, (1985).344 This 
change from suspicion of arbitration to a full embrace of its use in 
all settings is important because although the Court decided that 
any claim could be sent to arbitration, it did reiterate a 
safeguard.345 Again citing to Mitsubishi, the Court noted that an 
arbitral forum was appropriate for all sorts of claims, but only 
“[s]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [its] 
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum . . . .”346 
This safeguard was critical. It meant that arbitration was 
acceptable for any claim, no matter how serious, but this 
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presumption was qualified by the recognition that if an 
arbitration clause prevented a party from vindicating statutory 
rights, the clause could fail. This seemed reasonable since 
arbitration was supposed to be an alternative method of resolving 
disputes, not a place where disputes could not be resolved at all. 
The “vindication of rights” doctrine was reiterated in 
subsequent cases. For example, in Green Tree Fin. Corp.-
Alabama v. Randolph, the plaintiff asserted that the cost of 
arbitration would prohibit her from pursuing her claim.347 The 
Court rejected her assertion as unsupported by evidence.348 
However, the Court’s opinion strongly suggested that the 
“vindication of rights” theory was alive and well. The Court 
concluded that “a party seek[ing] to invalidate an arbitration 
agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively 
expensive . . . bears the burden of showing the likelihood of 
incurring such costs.”349 This statement implicitly recognized 
that if proven, the inability to vindicate rights is a bar to 
enforcing arbitration clauses.350 
This doctrine was reinforced by state court decisions. 
This included the California Supreme Court, when it handed 
down Discover Bank. In Discover Bank the California Supreme 
Court explained that consumers could not pursue small dollar 
claims individually.351 The Court noted that lawyers could not 
afford to take such small claims, and similarly, it would often be 
irrational for consumers to pursue such claims. The problem, as 
the court aptly noted, was that if no one could sue businesses for 
small dollar claims, then businesses could profit from illegality. 
Class action and arbitration waivers are not, in the abstract, 
exculpatory clauses. But because, as discussed above, damages in 
consumer cases are often small and because a company which 
wrongfully exacts a dollar from each of millions of customers will reap 
a handsome profit the class action is often the only effective way to 
halt and redress such exploitation.352  
Based on this reasoning, the California Supreme Court 
struck the arbitration clause because it was unconscionable. 
However, what is clear is that the California Supreme Court’s 
reasoning also fit well with the vindication of rights doctrine. 
 
 347 Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 83-84 (2000). 
 348 Id. at 90-92 & n.6. 
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 351 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108-09 (Cal. 2005), 
abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
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The California Supreme Court concluded that if it enforced the 
clause, consumers could not enforce their rights. Calling this 
unconscionable, or concluding that it bars the vindication of 
rights, are really two sides of the same coin. 
Other courts more explicitly made this connection. For 
example, in Whitney v. Alltel, a Missouri court stated: 
“Even claims arising under a statute designed to further important 
social policies may be arbitrated because so long as the prospective 
litigant effectively may vindicate his or her statutory cause of action 
in the arbitral forum, the statute serves its functions.” However, in 
some instances, where the arbitration provision is so prohibitive as to 
effectively deprive a party of his or her statutory rights, the 
arbitration agreement may be invalidated.353 
That court went on to find a class action waiver 
unconscionable after concluding that the wavier would deprive 
consumers of the right to pursue their claims.354 
Subsequent to Whitney and Discover Bank, many other 
states also struck down class action waivers after concluding 
that they would exculpate defendants from liability.355 As a 
result, when Concepcion reached the Supreme Court, many 
believed that the Discover Bank rule was merely a rephrasing of 
the vindication of rights doctrine and therefore, rather than 
being preempted, advanced the purpose of the FAA. 
2. Scalia’s Position in Concepcion 
Despite what some viewed as an alignment between 
California’s law and the vindication of rights doctrine, in 
Concepcion the majority concluded that California law stood as 
a barrier to enforcing the purpose of the FAA.356 
The dissent’s response was to point out that since any 
customer who arbitrated against AT&T was likely to receive 
about $30, enforcing the class action wavier would simply ensure 
that no one pursued claims against AT&T.357 In essence, the 
dissent was invoking the vindication of rights doctrine. This 
argument is persuasive. But Justice Scalia dismissed it out of 
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hand. He wrote: “The dissent claims that class proceedings are 
necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might otherwise 
slip through the legal system. But States cannot require a 
procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable 
for unrelated reasons.”358 And with those two sentences, Justice 
Scalia wrote away the dissent and struck the Discover Bank rule. 
3. Analysis 
What is interesting to note at the outset is that Justice 
Scalia never mentioned the vindication of rights doctrine at all in 
Concepcion. Much like he did with the preemption issue, he simply 
left out huge pieces of law as if they did not exist. This relieved him 
of explaining how it would advance the purpose of the FAA to 
stymy valid claims. Instead, without explanation, and ignoring the 
dissent’s point, Justice Scalia either (1) overruled the vindication of 
rights doctrine without admitting it, or (2) forgot it existed. 
By any measure, failing to reference an established 
doctrine and then dismissing the same doctrine when raised by 
the dissent is an example of reasoning infected by IR. The 
result is a decision with troubling implications. By ignoring 
binding precedent about the vindication of rights doctrine, Justice 
Scalia made the FAA stand as a tool for eliminating claims, not 
efficiently resolving them. He made the FAA a tool for businesses 
who seek to avoid answering to thousands of plaintiffs at once—a 
result that hardly seems consistent with the purpose of the FAA. 
The result is that now businesses include beautifully written 
arbitration clauses in their contracts, not with the purpose of 
using them, but with the assurance that such clauses can 
eliminate class actions altogether. 
4. Indicia of IR 
a. Confirmation bias 
The majority displayed confirmation bias by selecting 
language from the FAA about the value of arbitration without 
paying any attention at all to the vindication of rights doctrine. 
Specifically, the majority is quick to quote law that says that there 
is a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,”359 but it fails to 
consider the Court’s own recent assertions that an arbitration 
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clause is enforceable “so long as the prospective litigant effectively 
may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral 
forum.”360 
b. Substitution 
The majority did not engage in substitution. It never 
addressed the question of whether its decision was in line with 
the vindication of rights doctrine. 
c. Creation of My-Side Arguments 
My-side arguments abound in the majority’s opinion. The 
majority invented many reasons why striking the class action 
waiver would hurt AT&T.361 And it invented multiple justifications 
for how consumers could try to resolve their claims individually.362 
For example, the majority asserted that it is unlikely the claims 
will go unresolved because AT&T’s clause obligates it to pay a large 
sum of money if the settlement award exceeds AT&T’s settlement 
offer.363 Similarly, the majority pointed out AT&T’s clause requires 
it to pay attorney fees and lets consumers file their claims online 
for free.364 Yet, the majority never discussed the fact that most 
consumers will never find representation, that it is economically 
irrational for consumers to pursue $30 claims, or the fact that 
consumers have to read and understand AT&T’s complicated 
arbitration clause to even know their rights to begin with.365 
Although dozens of arguments that support enforcing 
the Discover Bank rule spring to mind, the majority failed to 
acknowledge or think of even one. Indeed, while the majority 
invented a parade of horrible events for companies if they are 
forced to class arbitrate, the majority never even discussed the 
detailed findings in the Discover Bank case, namely that if 
class action waivers are enforced in small damage consumer 
cases, consumers will lose their rights while businesses, 
because they can print their own “get-out-of-jail-free card,” will 
make millions even if their behavior is demonstrably illegal. All 
of this points to one-sided thinking that blinded the majority to 
a litany of arguments that would have undermined its holding. 
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d. Strained Reasoning 
There is little reasoning more strained than reaching a 
decision that implicitly overrules decades of precedent without 
even mentioning the relevant precedent or recognizing the 
tension in the law. And it is certainly hard to square the 
argument that the purpose of arbitration is to resolve disputes 
efficiently with the majority’s decision, which essentially 
assured that far fewer arbitrations will occur, and of those that 
do, they will always resolve only one claim at a time. 
e. Persistence 
The dissent specifically asserted that the majority decision 
would prevent consumers from pursuing their claims—a violation 
of the vindication of rights doctrine and the fundamental purpose 
of the FAA. The majority should have been persuaded, but 
instead it implicitly asserted that the vindication of rights 
doctrine did not matter. This was overt evidence that reason could 
not change the majority’s mind, as it had already made a decision. 
f. Overconfidence 
Completely failing to mention an entire body of law that 
is precisely on point, and then refusing to do so even when 
faced with it by the dissent, is extreme overconfidence. 
The scorecard looks like this:  
 
Confirmation Bias  X  
Substitution    
Creation of “my-side” arguments  X  
Strained reasoning  X  
Persistence  X  
Overconfidence  X 
IV. WHAT IS THIS REALLY ALL ABOUT? 
If by now you are convinced that the majority’s decisions 
in Stolt and Concepcion are examples of the elephant leading 
the rider, that is, examples of intuition rationalization at work, 
then the only remaining question is what swayed the elephant.366 
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Some scholars have suggested the answer, implying 
that it was the majority’s distaste for class actions and its 
sympathy for businesses (really two sides of the same coin) that 
drove the decision. For example, Alan Scott Rau wrote an article 
that details the new limits on arbitrable power.367 In his article, 
he notes that Scalia and the majority seem to have a “visceral” 
response to class actions.368 He also remarks that businesses do 
not include arbitration clauses because they like resolving 
disputes or because they fear judicial review; instead, they 
include them to avoid claim aggregation in which they could be 
required to answer to multiple consumers.369 He suggests that 
Justice Scalia was sympathetic to this goal, and points to 
Scalia’s mention of “in terrorem” class actions—which Justice 
Scalia suggests are class actions that force businesses to settle 
what are essentially frivolous claims.370 
In addition to pointing out this language in AT&T, Rau 
notes how unusual the result in Stolt truly is. 
One would have to invest a good deal of time and effort before being able 
to identify cases – which in the end amount only to a trivial number – in 
which the Supreme Court has been willing to mandate or approve the 
annulment of an arbitral award. (And before now these have been 
strictly outliers, grounded either on the lack of any agreement at all, or 
on some impropriety in the composition of the arbitral tribunal). But 
then we come to Stolt-Nielsen: It can hardly be accidental that the 
specter of class relief in arbitration is just about the only feature of the 
arbitration process that has been anathema to the business community 
– or that this rare decision restrictive of arbitral power happens, wonder 
of wonders, to be one in which a business-oriented court manages more 
or less to relieve it of any such anxiety.371 
Following up on this assertion, Rau also suggests that 
“Stolt-Nielsen is in this sense entirely unprincipled” because 
“avoidance of class relief is the engine driving the machine.”372 
Rau has it right. The common threads in the opinions 
are (1) a dislike for class actions and class arbitrations and (2) 
a genuine concern for businesses and their well-being. And the 
opinions do far more than express the majority’s feelings. The 
decline of class actions saved, and will continue to save, businesses 
millions of dollars per year, all at the expense of individual 
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consumers.373 Stolt largely eliminates class arbitration and 
Concepcion eviscerates many contract-based class actions, 
including claims that might arise in any lending context or 
employment setting. As a result, businesses can now include an 
arbitration clause that prohibits class actions and be almost 
certain it will be enforced. Businesses are immunized from 
certain liabilities, even for crystal clear violations of the law. 
Considering the real world results of Stolt and 
Concepcion drives home the detrimental impact on class action 
litigation. Because of these decisions, although many states 
have cases and statutes recognizing that some class action 
waivers are unconscionable, these laws cannot be enforced in 
the arbitration context. The result is that an arbitration clause 
is treated differently from other contract provision. This is a 
legal absurdity that encourages businesses to pile their most 
questionable provisions into arbitration clauses, where it seems 
they will receive special treatment. 
A shining example of this exists in a case I have worked on 
for six years. In Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, Plaintiff asserted 
that Defendant was violating Missouri law relating to title 
loans.374 Missouri Title Loan’s contract contained an arbitration 
clause that prohibited class actions.375 Plaintiff conducted 
discovery, hired experts, and proved to the trial court that the 
class action waiver would create immunity for the defendant 
because consumers could not find representation to bring 
individual claims for only a few hundred or a few thousand 
dollars.376 The defendant produced no contrary evidence.377 The 
Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s holding that 
the class action waiver was unconscionable.378 The Missouri 
Supreme Court also noted that the clause was a de facto 
exculpatory clause and failed under general Missouri law.379 The 
result was clear: in Missouri, if there was evidence that a contract 
provision would prevent a consumer from pursuing his or her 
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rights, then it was too one-sided—and thus unconscionable—to be 
enforced.380 
However, after Concepcion, the United States Supreme 
Court vacated the decision.381 On remand, the Missouri 
Supreme Court struck the arbitration clause because it 
contained a number of other offensive provisions, but it did not 
and could not rely upon the existence of the class action 
waiver.382 Indeed, on the same day, the Missouri Supreme Court 
was forced to remand a different case for further consideration 
because the trial court had rested its finding of 
unconscionability on the existence of a class action waiver.383 
The result was that the case was remanded to the trial court 
and was never pursued as a class action. 
The result in Missouri is now clear. If a party presents 
decisive evidence that a contract term prevents him from 
pursing his legal rights, that term is unconscionable. This is 
true for class action waivers in small damage cases. However, 
despite the fact that this is general Missouri law, if the 
business is clever enough to put the class action waiver under 
the heading of “arbitration,” the clause magically becomes 
enforceable. This holds true no matter how much evidence there 
is that enforcing the clause will prevent the resolution of disputes. 
While in private practice, my class action team alone passed on 
dozens of cases in which we concluded that businesses were 
acting unethically but that a class action wavier in an 
arbitration clause would prevent us from pursuing the claim. 
This included claims against businesses like payday 
lenders, who in Missouri, charge over 400% interest on loans.384 
This is a salient example of the need for class actions because, 
prior to the errant decisions of the majority, two payday 
lenders in Missouri were sued in class actions. They settled the 
lawsuits for over $30 million in cash and debt relief to the 
affected individuals.385 These lawsuits impacted about 200 
payday loan stores, but there are roughly 1,000 payday lenders 
in Missouri.386 It is an absolute certainty that more lawsuits 
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would have been filed to challenge the practices of the other 
payday lenders, but Concepcion intervened, and in doing so 
ensured that payday lenders could continue to engage in 
questionable legal practices with no concern that they would ever 
have to answer to all their customers. Further, no individuals 
were likely to pursue claims because the payday loans were 
only $500 or less.387 
These results are not anomalous. A year after the 
Supreme Court handed down Concepcion, Public Citizen, a 
group that monitors a variety of constitutional and national 
issues impacting citizens, wrote a report entitled Justice Denied, 
in which it chronicled the impact Concepcion had on class 
actions.388 The report concluded that “the decision provided 
corporations with a tool to insulate themselves from facing 
meaningful accountability for cheating large numbers of 
consumers out of amounts too small to make pursuing individual 
cases economically feasible.”389 The report used Westlaw’s KeyCite 
function to identify 76 potential class actions that were 
dismissed by courts who cited to Concepcion.390 And of course, 
the report could not capture the hundreds of cases that were 
not filed or were voluntarily dismissed for the same reason. 
To further illustrate how the Concepcion immunity 
blanket works, consider a hypothetical. A national cell phone 
company with 20 million customers includes a class action 
waiver in its arbitration clause in its contract with each 
customer. That company could, tomorrow, add a $1 
questionable fee to each customer’s bill. The fee would generate 
roughly $20 million dollars in revenue the next month. If the 
fee were illegal, each customer’s only choice would be to file an 
arbitration action for $1 in damages. Under the majority’s 
holdings in Stolt and Concepcion, there is simply no way to hold 
this company accountable for all the potentially illegal gains. As a 
result, a company is far more likely to test the boundaries of 
illegality. If it gets it wrong and breaks the law, it is almost 
certain to answer to no one. Even if a few zealots do file individual 
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claims, the company’s gains still greatly exceed the money it pays 
to settle claims—cheating becomes profitable business.391 
These results are ironic. Because the majority 
eliminated both class arbitration and class actions in many 
contexts, and because this was accomplished by favoring 
arbitration clauses that require individual arbitration, 
arbitrations are less likely to happen, and the purpose of the 
FAA has been eroded. Yet all of this occurred in the name of 
the FAA. As a result, a statute designed to encourage the 
resolution of disputes now stands as an obstacle to pursuing 
the claims at all. Because of this, the prophecy of Discover 
Bank is now entirely true: 
Class action and arbitration waivers are not, in the abstract, 
exculpatory clauses. But because, as discussed above, damages in 
consumer cases are often small and because a company which 
wrongfully exacts a dollar from each of millions of customers will 
reap a handsome profit . . . the class action is often the only effective 
way to halt and redress such exploitation.392 
V. MOVING FORWARD 
The analysis above highlights the dangers of unchecked 
IR. It suggests that decisions with wide-ranging implications 
can be hijacked by IR without judges even knowing it. In the test 
cases, the majority asserted, and probably believed, that it 
reached an inevitable result driven by immutable reason. It was 
blind to its own IR. And as discussed above, this led to Court 
decisions that should immediately be overruled because they do 
not display the legal reasoning one should demand from the 
highest court in the United States and because they produce real 
world results that are equally out of step with the law. 
But this is not an article about reversing two court 
cases. It is an article about the broader implications of IR. If IR 
truly pops up most when strong emotions are present, then IR 
can be expected to turn up in some of the most contentious and 
important cases in the country. Debates over abortion, gun 
rights, whether companies can give money to political 
campaigns, whether companies can be held responsible for their 
human rights behavior in other countries, the rights of 
 
 391 For more on the Court’s wholesale changes to class action law since 2010, 
see Campbell, supra note 373. 
 392 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108-09 (Cal. 2005), 
abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
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homosexuals, and even who should be named President could all 
be (and may have already been) compromised by IR. 
What can be done? I see two initial steps. First, there is 
already a great deal known about cognitive science and 
decision making in particular. This field of inquiry needs to be 
pointed out more precisely to the judiciary. Presently, although 
there are increasing numbers of scholars studying how jurors 
are impacted by a variety of cognition principles,393 I am aware 
of few large scale studies to determine how judges reach their 
conclusions. Parsing out the role IR already plays in decision 
making, and doing this with some empirical rigor, would be a 
significant advance. 
But identifying what role IR is playing in decision 
making is only a beginning. There are larger questions 
implicated. Justice Scalia criticizes judges who ask, “Is this 
decision good for the little guy?”394 But my analysis reveals that 
Scalia asks similar questions, at least internally, such as, “Is this 
decision good for big business?” Serious debate could and should 
be had about what role emotion and moral value determinations 
should play in decision making. In other words, is it necessary to 
eliminate emotion, or is it simply necessary to overtly name it 
when it plays a role? After all, if deeply held beliefs will, at least 
in some cases, play a role even when unacknowledged, it may be 
that transparent discussion of these beliefs is the better course. 
The question above will be informed by yet another 
query. Can IR be eliminated? Can people be taught to avoid it? 
There is already some literature on this, but I know of none in 
the judicial realm. Controlled studies in which people are 
educated about IR, then asked to engage in cognitive tasks, 
could reveal how much IR can be tamed. These studies could 
prove especially interesting if applied to judges. Imagine 
educating judges about IR, then asking them to review their 
own past decisions 
At a minimum, cognitive science should have a seat at the 
table in judicial training programs. Judges are in the business of 
making decisions; they should be acutely aware of the cognition 
challenges that all people face when doing so. If this education 
occurs, could judges identify IR in their own decisions? Would 
they recognize a need for peer input to at least curb the influence 
 
 393 See, e.g., Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
174, 176 (2010). Bernard Chao, a colleague of mine, Christopher Robertson, and I are 
also working on an article that will study the anchor effect on jury verdicts. 
 394 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 35, at 18. 
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of their own feelings? These are unanswered questions that 
demand answers. 
My intuition (and I recognize the irony) is that 
education about IR is like what many defenders used to say 
about Michael Jordan. “You can’t stop him, you can only hope to 
contain him.” We cannot eliminate cognitive errors, especially in 
the fast-flow of everyday life. But, in judicial opinions—which can 
be considered and revised—we can hope to reduce IR’s influence 
by making it more transparent. This would produce more 
consistent judicial opinions, reduce the risk that opinions are 
driven by quiet undercurrents, and, in all, be more consistent 
with the common law tradition. 
CONCLUSION 
IR abounds. We all engage in it, and this includes the 
conservative majority. These are important truths. Many have 
lambasted the conservative majority for business-friendly 
decisions, but more is needed. Beyond conservative or liberal 
viewpoints, we must understand what drives judicial decision 
making. We must ask why and how? 
IR is most likely to appear when deeply held beliefs are 
at issue, and that has serious implications for the work of 
judges, whether they sit in trial courts or on the Supreme 
Court. An analysis of Stolt and Concepcion reveals that IR 
binds and blinds, bringing those with like views together and 
then preventing them from seeing their own logical fallacies. In 
doing so, it lets the elephant run amok, reducing the rider to a 
post hoc justifier. As discussed, this can have real world 
consequences of immense proportions. 
The solution is to study the IR undercurrent, to educate 
those who are most impacted by it, and hopefully in doing so, to 
heed the advice of Justice Sonia Sotomayor. It is only by knowing 
and understanding when “personal bias is seeping in to our 
decision-making” that we can hope to be “fair and impartial.”395  
 
 395 Interview by Gwen Ifill with Sonia Sotomayor, supra note 1. 
